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Preface 
The End of a Military Century? was originally written at the end of 
1989 and the beginning ofl990 but has since been updated to include 
the most significant changes within the context of East-West rela-
tions. Thus, it largely predates the dismembering of the former ussR 
and before the United Nations assumed an increasing role in the 
resolution of internai conflicts - such as in Yugoslavia and 
Cambodia. However, these events simply reinforce, ifit were need, 
the validity of the "peace through right" model, whose historical 
origins 1 have tried to outline in this study. 
There is simply no alternative to "order" except "anarchy," 
and the cost of war bas become suicidai and unaffordable even for 
the mightiest nations. The GulfWar bas been priced well above $60 
billion: of which, $54 billion was paid by foreign nations. 
If there is one essential lesson that the countries of the 
South must learn from East-West opposition, it is the futility of 
relying only on military spending to change an adversarial political 
situation into a partnership of dependent cooperation. Other prior-
ities are also apparent, such as the need to uphold international 
institutions and law, to protect the environment, and to maintain 
the struggle against drug trafficking and terrorism. 
It would be naive to assume that the lesson will be quickly 
learned by potential aggressors, however. Until it is, the industrial-
ized countries of the North must counter continued efforts on the 
part of developing countries of the South to overcome perceived 
grievances through military means, including terrorism. Terrorism 
and that other antisocial behaviour, narcotics trafficking, are symp-
toms of deep social malaise - primarily poverty and injustice -
that form ready platforms for criminals as well as activists. Social 
injustice and disparities ofwealth and power must be the targets of 
those seeking peace; in that struggle, military techniques are an 
ineffective weapon in the arsenal required. The arms race is not 
cost effective in gaining the goals ofpeace and international stabil-
ity. A new conscience is perhaps slowly emerging in the North. It is 
to be hoped that the message will also be heard in the South. 
For reasons of space, only one appendix - on the military 
expenditures of countries - is published in full in this book. In all 
other cases, numbered supplements are referred to: these are avail-
able on request in disk form (Macintosh disk and MicroExcel 
program) from the Strategic Studies Program, Quebec Centre for 
International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of 
Laval, Quebec, PQ, Canada, G1K 7P4. 
This study would not have been possible with the encour-
agement and full support of the former President of the Inter-
national Development Research Centre, Mr Ivan L. Head. I offer him 




The End of a Military Century? 
Chapter 1 
Three Principal Models of International Relations 
Crises in international relations 1 and in strategic studies2 are forcing 
us to pose new questions on the issues of international peace and 
security. In addition, Gorbachev's rise to power and his subsequent 
demise, as well as the breakdown of the Soviet empire, altered the 
fundamental dynamics of East-West relations. After almost 45 years 
of the arms race between the two major ideological camps, one of 
which defended democratic values, the other, the benefits of a 
socialist system, and after a troubled period ofrapid decolonization 
and an unprecedented increase in regional conflicts throughout the 
world, observers are finally becoming aware of new problems. 
Today, pollution, the environment, the possible prolifera-
tion ofnuclear and chemical weapons and of the technology behind 
these weapons, terrorism and the deterioration of the social envi-
ronment from drug abuse, and the ever-increasing effort required 
to combat AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) and other 
sexually transmitted diseases are among the major problems. The 
title of a work by Edgar Morin, Pour sortir du 20e siècle (Leaving the 
2oth Century) indicates well the dilemma that 21st-century mankind 
will have to face (Morin 1981). If the world's nations and leaders do 
not change their attitudes and perceptions, if the foresight needed 
to establish a rational system for managing our economic resources 
cannot be found, the world risks collapsing into total chaos. 
1 Title of a special issue of Études internationales (vol. 15, no. 4, December 1984) pub-
lished by the Centre québécois de relations internationales. 
2 See special issue entitled Les études stratégiques : où en sommes-nous of Études 
internationales (vol. 20, no. 3, September 1989). 
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In a recent work, Barry Buzan (1983) provided a short but 
penetrating description of the differences between the two basic 
approaches to international relations theory: 
Recause realist policies require the arming of the state and a 
power-struggle analysis of the system. they naturally clash with 
idealist policies based on disarmament, international coopera-
tion, and a harmony-of-interests mode/ of the system. Ifthat clash 
is seen as so basic that it precludes a meaningful mix between 
them, then each alternative must carry atone the whole burden of 
security. To do this the realist policy must exaggerate the neces-
sityfor a powerful state, and the idealist one must leap ail the way 
into utopias of general and complete disarmament and world 
government. 
Better than anyone else, Buzan bas defined the two extremes illus-
trated by what we have called the schools of "peace by might" and 
"peace by right" (Legault and Fortmann 1989). Although they have 
traditionally always been treated as approximately concurrent phe-
nomena, the two schools of thought have different historical roots. 
One is actually more recent than the other. "Peace by right" bas its 
origins in the Judeo-Christian tradition of social justice; that is, in 
the desire for equality among the members of a given society, and 
in the will to solve conflicts peacefully. Sever al authors credit 
Erasmus with the concept of pacifism (in this regard, see the 
remarkable work of Barrea 1986); in 1517, be called on bis fellows to 
"conspire of a common accord, and with all our strength, against 
war." The origins of "peace by right" can also be seen in the legal 
positivism and plans for eternal peace of Crucé (Émeric de Lacroix, 
known as Crucé, wrote bis memoirs in 1638), Sully (advisor to Henry 
IV of France), Abbé de Saint-Pierre (in 1712-1713, be developed a plan 
for eternal peace in Europe), and Immanuel Kant (be drew up bis 
famous plan for eternal peace in 1795). Today, this doctrine is advo-
cated by the school ofpeace through world government. The major 
international conferences in The Hague at the end of the last 
century, the League of Nations, and the United Nations (UN) were 
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ail the result of institutional3 and legal positivist trends aimed at 
regulating international relations. 
The "peace by might" school, on the other band, came out 
of scientific positivism and the Industrial Revolution, both of which 
made possible mass conscription and a logistical organization com-
patible with the maneuvers and firepower of a modern army. 
Modern strategy is based on the same premises of scientific posi-
. tivism as operational research, game theory and the calculation of 
probabilities constitute its very foundations, while the "technetronic 
era," to use an expression much favoured by Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
the former national security advisor to former president Jimmy 
Carter, is another industrial revolution of the developed world. 
Politically, integration theories and the analysis of inter-
national institutions were the result of the functionalism that 
appeared between the two world wars. Major areas of cooperation 
had to be kept sheltered from the political-strategic opposition 
between the two blocs, where harmony of interests - the func-
tional approach - could eventually guide the states to base their 
policies on non-zero-sum games, with each reaping a legitimate 
advantage from its association with the other. The theories of the 
"realist" school were born from the disillusionment of the Cold War, 
the disenchantment with certain international institutions, espe-
cially the UN, which was made to look ridiculous by the successive 
vetoes of the USSR, and the disorder resulting from the violent clash 
of the two ideologies, both of which wanted to emerge sole victor. 
Throughout history, the polarization of a political system 
has always led the protagonists into endless conflict, with excluded 
third parties most often being reduced to playing the role of simple 
observers or pawns in agame of international chess. The balance-
of-power theory, of which Richelieu, Frederick the Great, and 
Bismarck were in their times both great masters and disciples, was 
replaced, after World War II, by the so-called balance-of-terror 
3 "To the apolitical pacifism of the Anabaptists Mennonites and the revolutionary 
tendencies of the millennium movement of the 16th century, Crucé would be the first 
to propose a committed, political, institutional pacifism that was reformist on an inter-
national scale and, therefore, termed utopie." (Barre a 1986: 138. [unofficial translation]). 
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theory, by which the two superpowers controlled the right to life 
and death on the planet. This was largely attributable to rapid 
developments in technology and to a new branch of international 
politics now known as "strategy." This term, which was originally 
applied solely to the nuclear arena, is now so widely used that it is 
impossible to say what it really means; however, it includes study-
ing the role of force in international relations. 
Nuclear strategy is basically the result of the technological 
luxury that nations acquired in their race for strategic superiority. 
The "hard" sciences (atomic, thermonuclear, ballistic, propulsion, 
and guidance systems) and the major schools of thought, such as 
that espoused by the Rand Corporation, were fascinated by the 
rapid evolution of technology that made the development of strate-
gic studies possible. The social sciences and psychology only later 
became interested in studying conflict relationships from a socio-
logical or behavioural point ofview, particularly in terms ofbehav-
iourism and the quantitative study of conflicts.4 
The countries in which this phenomenon was occurring 
were precisely those that, because of their resources and needs, 
shaped an entire generation of strategists who then set out to max-
imize the well-being of or the benefits to their respective countries. 
They attempted to discover the secrets and conditions that, one way 
or another, could either stabilize the nuclear balance between the 
superpowers or cause dangerous imbalances in the race for tech-
nological superiority. The most serious of the strategists, people 
such as Brennan, Halperin, and Bull, undertook arms control, that 
is, everything that could help limit destruction if the system of 
nuclear deterrence failed. Whether one likes it or not, strategy was 
used by the state mainly because in this area it had complete 
control. It is not surprising that, under these conditions, strategists 
were nationalists at heart, concerned mainly with maximizing bene-
fits for their all-powerful Leviathan. 
4 It is true that Quincy Wright and Lewis Richardson were the great precursors of 
sociological studies on war and peace, even before Bernard Brodie published his book 
The Absolute Weapon (1946), but the study ofnuclear strategy will, for ail practical pur-
poses and for many years, overshadow the study of conflicts in courses offered at large 
American universities. 
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At the same time, the school of functionalism, integration, 
and the regulation of conflicts by means of institutions suffered 
setback after setback, partly because of the Cold War that plunged 
the UN into a series of crises from the Congo, through the "tyranni-
cal majority" to bankruptcy, partly because of the general rise in 
conflicts in the Third World, but also and especially because the 
internationalist cause, which wanted to maximize benefits for the 
international community, failed to find support. 
The main characteristics of the two schools of thought are 
summarized in Table 1, as well as the search for peace through 
"transsystemic" objectives,5 or what the young pacifist school of the 
196os called "superordinate" objectives. This school ofthought may 
reflect ancient oriental philosophies such as Taoism, or the need for 
individual development in harmony with the laws of nature and the 
universe. The modern origins of this approach can be found in the 
contemporary emphasis on ecology. However, at a deeper level, it 
is the result of individual disenchantment with the pseudoprogress 
of technological and industrial development that, from Hiroshima 
to Chernobyl, has caused so many problems for civilizations that 
claim or wish to be highly developed. The price for such technology 
today is too high to pay. The vision of a shared planet is the basis 
for this school of thought and the concept of "scientific progress" is 
questioned more often than not. In the military sphere, this model 
is associated with the idea of "common security," a concept difficult 
to define, and, in the economic sphere, with the Brundtland Report 
(Brundtland and Khalid 1987) and concepts related to "sustainable 
development." 
This third model is not merely a synthesis of the two models 
that have dominated major historical developments. From Utopia 
to the noble ideals of world government, from the controlled appli-
cation of force practiced by Bismarck to the enormous human 
disasters represented by the two world wars, there have been varia-
tions in bath ofthese two approaches. They have never coexisted in 
5 The prefix "trans" is used here as meaning "through," as in transparent, and not 
as meaning "beyond," as in "transalpine". 
Table 1. Main characteristics of schools of thought in international relations.a 
School of 
thought 
Peace by Might 



























Alliance of "hard" 
and "soft" sciences 
a The first two sections ofthis table are from Legault and Fortmann (1989: 407). 
b Peace through the pursuit of transsystemic objectives. 
Results 
Strategic studies 







Maximize benefits for 
country or unit in 
question 
Maximize benefits for 
the group 
Maximize chances for 
survival of 
the planet 
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their pure forms, as both have risen and fallen in favour, as history 
has witnessed. The "transsystemic" approach is new in that it 
expands human consciousness. This is something that Maritain and 
others were already predicting more than 50 years ago, and that 
Fritjof Capra with his bestseller, The Tao of Physics (1979), as well 
as Uncommon Wisdom (1988), was able to popularize. However, 
clearly the ultimate goal ofthis third school is to maximize survival 
chances for the planet. There is a desire for renewed international 
cooperation based on the concepts of social justice and harmonious 
worldwide development that takes into account the needs of the 
individual as well as the environment. In addition to these ethical 
considerations, there is a global awareness of the common destiny 
of humanity. Whether one likes it or not, the concepts of "scientific 
progress" and "secular thinking" are called into question by a code 
of ethics that purports to be more universal. 
This is where an alliance between the two older models 
cornes into play. The "hard" sciences and the "soft" sciences, or 
social sciences, must work together. Strategy, law, institutional reg-
ulations, and national, transnational, and international cooperation 
can and must internet positively ifwe are to begin to find a solution 
to the urgent problems facing our planet. No one is naïve enough, 
however, to believe that the third model will make the first two dis-
appear. On the contrary, the first, in particular, will probably con-
tinue to exist. To achieve the aims of the third model, the most 
destructive effects of the first would have to be limited, and the 
second and third approaches encouraged as much as possible. 
This model also advocates a change in the ethical debate: 
it would no longer be focused on the two extremes of nationalism 
and internationalism, to which history has long accustomed us. The 
argument would be raised to the "transsystemic" peace level; 
strategists, jurists, philosophers, politicians, and ecologists would 
all try to maximize the possibilities for the planet's survival. 
In contrast to the first model, in which politics makes 
science its slave to ensure its own economic, technical, and 
strategic superiority, in the third model the sciences would 
exercise control over political goals, to give them the global or 
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"transsystemic" meaning they have never had in the past. In fact, 
it raises once again the age-old question of the relationship between 
science and society, both of which are responsible for the conse-
quences of their actions and behaviour.6 Research on peace would 
gain acceptance ifpoliticians understood the meaning ofhistory and 
accepted their responsibilities; if they see the basic necessity for 
an interdisciplinary viewpoint to discuss the individual and the 
environment. 
6 We do not have enough room here to discuss the epistemological issues related to 
the various theories on international relations. Specialists tend to present the "global 
approach," "dependence theories," and explanations according to the "international 
capitalist system" as constituting a separate school of international relations. In the 
view of these same specialists, socioeconomic disparities and dependency situations 
are more important than the "billiard ball" mode!, in which the nation-state and the 
anarchical structure of the international system are the main variables in any expia· 
nation of the behaviour of nations. In this regard, see Korany (!984) and Viotti and 
Kauppi (!987, especially chapter 4). This view is really a more elaborate form of struc· 
tural functionalism, but is not restricted to that school of thought. While we are pre-
pared to accept the underlying premises of this view, we do not feel it constitutes a 
separate entity. Structural functionalism is possible within ail other approaches. This 
is the main reason we prefer to base our discussion on the three schools of thought 
given above, as ail three involve a debate on different political aims and thus different 
values. What we are concerned with here are value systems. As regards the episte-
mological and philosophical issues related to value systems, we refer the reader to a 
short simple work by Popper (!981). 
Chapter 2 
The Gulf Crisis: Should the Three Models be Revised? 
The occurrence of the Gulf Crisis confirmed the relevance of the 
three models developed in the previous chapter. Before we discuss 
it in more detail, it may be useful to recall the indecisiveness 
inherent in diplomatie and strategic leadership, a key concept in 
the philosophy of history as developed by Raymond Aron (1962). 
On the philosophical plane, nobody can claim to know what 
would have happened or what the international system would have 
been today if World War I or II had not occurred. In the same way, 
before the start of hostilities in the Gulf, the observer could only 
draw one simple conclusion: with or without a war in the Gulf, the 
situation was, or was becoming, untenable. 
In other words, between action and inaction, there was a 
considerable margin for value judgments. Hard-liners believed that 
all mediation formulas had been exhausted and that the ultimatum 
of 15 January 1991 was the last stage in a long process that would 
not have occurred except for Iraq's intransigence. Believers in 
"peace by right" stressed that sanctions would need more time to 
take effect, and that any kind of peace, even an unsatisfactory one, 
was preferable to a war. 1 In philosophical terms, the question 
inevitably became: was Saddam Hussein preferable to war or would 
millions of Kurdish refugees be preferable to the prewar situation 
that still existed in January 1991? If the war did not occur, could this 
1 Although some considered the peaceful settlement of differences as a normative 
value, this is nevertheless written in ail constitution al charters of international orga-
nizations. The basic differences between Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter illus-
trate clearly the crucial dilemma that put believers in "peace by right" against believers 
of "peace by might" in the Gulf Crisis. 
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mean that Saddam Hussein would profit by developing his military 
power further so that, one day, he could finally cross swords with 
Israel? 
Ail these questions clearly remain and although commen-
tators have answered them differently, they ail invoked the judg-
ment of history to justify their opinions. However, any judgment of 
history is only the one you choose to see. Militarily, the situation is 
probably less dangerous today than it was formerly, but on the lev el 
of human suffering, it is probably just as or more unacceptable than 
it was before the war. The question now is about the duty to assist 
displaced persons, including millions of Kurdish refugees who are 
deprived of basic food and housing needs. 
ln the three models, the debate is as outlined. To the "peace 
by might" school, the Gulf War is largely the political product of 
countries that profited from the Iran-Iraq War by shamelessly 
rearming Iraq,2 just as the USA, a decade earlier, had made itself 
the champion of regional stability and balance between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. What happened to Iran in the early 198os is common 
knowledge. The post-Gulf situation is not without its contradic-
tions, because the USA has a contract to rearm Saudi Arabia for 
US$23 billion (Klare 199ia) while still insisting on the principle that 
the Gulf States must not be rearmed, as happened throughout the 
198os with well-known results. Considerable tensions thus exist 
within the same model: that is, between the strategic need for 
balance and the pressing need for arms control in the region. 
ln the area of law and peaceful regulation of differences, 
current diplomatie schemes to call some type of regional, multilat-
eral, or international conference on the Middle East indicate the 
beginning of a dialogue on the current dramatic problems. Several 
solutions are being considered: the exchange ofland for peace; con-
fidence-building measures and regional stability through the intro-
duction of demilitarized zones, possibly monitored by international 
supervisory forces; increased control in the area of nonproliferation 
2 Not so very long ago, a French newspaper headline read: "L'Occident à l'assaut de 
sa créature" (The West is attacking its own creation). · 
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of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and more severe 
restrictions on high-technology transfers. Only time will tell if these 
efforts are successful. In the meantime, it must be acknowledged 
that simply transferring the lessons of the Cold War to this region 
will not be enough to ensure peace and international security. That 
will only corne from the democratization of most of these regimes, 
too long closed in on themselves, and especially from an improved 
distribution of the region's resources between rich and poor coun-
tries. Only when the countries of the region have understood the 
need to improve the distribution ofresources and to maintain secu-
rity with a minimum of military strength does the second model 
have a chance to influence the region, at the expense of the first. 
Nobody can claim that the third model played arole in the 
military operations of the Gulf War. In fact, one state burned and 
sacked another, using a "scorched-earth" policy effectively aimed 
at preventing Kuwait from undertaking any economic reconstruc-
tion for a long time. Probably these were short-sighted calculations 
and Kuwait, thanks to its financial resources, will succeed in limit-
ing the ecological disaster that is already being felt in other regions 
of the world. In this situation, the "transsystemic" model would 
encourage concentrating on various regional hydroelectric projects 
rather than the disastrous effects of the Aswan Dam on the region 
or the possible diversion of the water course of some rivers rising 
in Turkey, essential for the irrigation of Syria and Iraq. 
Se en after the fact, it is not clear if the perspective of a new 
world order, so desirable on the eve of the Gulf conflict, is any closer 
to us now than it was 1 year ago. Arms are again being delivered to 
the region, several countries are still suspected of secretly manu-
facturing chemical3 or biological weapons, military budgets show 
no sign of decreasing, the internai military production of countries 
such as Israel is, to a large part, intended for export, and the 
3 According to a report by the American Marine Information Services (Statement of 
Rear Admirai Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence before the 
Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee on Intelligence Issues (7 March 1991)), six Arab countries (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Libya, and Syria) have an offensive chemical capacity, while Saudi Arabia may 
also have a similar capacity. 
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Palestinian issue appears to remain as insoluble as before, even if 
the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) emerged 
from the Gulf Crisis discredited. 
On the other band, some progress can be noted for the 
second model. Iraq's acceptance ofResolution 687 of the UN Security 
Council will be a crucial test for this organization, with regard to 
the controls and monitoring measures to prevent the proliferation 
of large-scale destructive arms in the region. Furthermore, the 
international community as well as the European Community claim 
that they have an increased "duty to interfere"4 in the region to 
bring humanitarian aid to displaced populations. Without going as 
far as to claim that these developments constitute a precursor to 
the ever-increasing trend toward stronger individual rights and 
weaker state power, it should still be noted, if only to prove that 
there is progress in this area. 
4 The expression was coined by Bernard Kuchner, former French minister for 
Humanitarian Aid. The phrase has since been repeated by several people. including 
Minister Roland Dumas and legal expert Bettati. It implies the right to observation by 
the international community. when internai events cause others to carry the costs of 
a humanitarian catastrophe. despite Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that stipula tes non-
interference in the internai affairs of a country. The Americans forbidding Iraq to inter-
vene militarily north of the 36th parallel would be interpreted in the same sense. 
Chapter 3 
The Canadian Example: 
Peace by Might or Peace by Right? 
We could draw on the history of our neighbours to the south or on 
contemporary literature to illustrate the special characteristics and 
intensity of the debate on the two models we have endeavoured to 
describe. However, this exercise would be tiresome, and entail use-
less academic explanations. 
The Canadian example is more familiar tous, and also illus-
trates much better the complexity of the arguments we have just 
discussed. In a recent study (Legault and Fortmann 1989), we ana-
lyzed the contents of the Commons debates and the press during the 
Diefenbaker (1957-1963) and Trudeau (1978-1984) eras. Almost 
30 years separate the beginning and end of the periods in question: 
the Diefenbaker era was in the middle of the Cold War, whereas the 
comparable period chosen for the Trudeau government began 
against a background of detente and ended with a renewal of the 
Cold War at the beginning of the l98os. 
Three major conclusions can be drawn from our study. The 
first involves the international system; the second, Canada's desired 
role; and the third, Canadians' perceptions of the USA and the USSR. 
Despite the differences in the two periods, there is a 
remarkable continuity between the eras in question, at least as 
regards Canadian attitudes to the international system. Among the 
variables that received much attention in the House of Commons, 
four were significant and their cumulative total indicates unequiv-
ocally that, in 67% of the cases, Members of Parliament (MPs) in the 
Diefenbaker era were either in favour of the UN, in favour of disar-
mament, in favour of increased North-South relations, or in favour 
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of detente generally [Table 2]. In other words, in the middle of the 
Cold War, the tone for Canadian attitudes toward the international 
system was already set, which is more than a little surprising. Of 
course, during the last 7 years of the Trudeau administration, 
opinion shüted slightly in favour of stronger East-West ties, which 
explains the de sire for a change of the Cold War to astate ofrenewed 
detente, but there was also a significant trend in favour ofincreas-
ing assistance to developing countries - in our interpretation, the 
strengthening of North-South ties includes assistance. In other 
words, to relate this to the foregoing discussion, Canadian MPs rep-
resent the most significant aspect of the "peace by right" model. 
Paradoxically, however (and this was our second observa-
tion), the "peace-might" or "peace-security" dichotomy is reflected 
clearly in the types of action supported by the House of Commons. 
Although, under Diefenbaker, about 23% of the MPs were in favour 
ofpromoting peace and the peace movement, slightly over 15% also 
wanted an increased role for Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) [Table 3]. This dichotomy is less evident during 
the Trudeau era, although, as we shall see shortly, it was very 
obvious in Canadian newspapers. From 1978 to 1984, the most sig-
nificant variable (44%), as indicated by the Commons debates, was 
the promotion ofpeace and the peace movement. Other considera-
tions were the stated desire for a more neutral and independent 
Canada. 
Table 2. Type of international systems advocated by 
Canadian Members of Parliamenta. 
Diefenbaker era Trudeau era 
(I957-1963)b (1978-1984)c 
lncrease power of UN 20% Reduce tension and conflicts 
Prornote disarrnarnent 18% Strengthen East-West ties 
36% 
28% 
Reduce tension and conflicts 15% Reinforce détente and arrns control 17% 
Strengthen North-South ties 14% Increase foreign aid 12% 
Other 33% Other 7% 
•Ail explanations regarding sarnpling, rnethodology, and variables used in the analy-
sis can be found in Legault et al. (Ig8g). Percentages are calculated according to the 
nurnber of topics identified by each speaker in the Bouse of Cornrnons. 
b Il= 152. 
c Il= 875. 
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Table 3. Types of action supported in the House of Commons. 
Diefenbaker era Trudeau era 
(1957-1963) (1978-1984) 
Canada should encourage peace 27% 32% 
Should be more independent 22% 15% 
Should act as an interpreter for 
East-West issues 15% 20% 
Should give more support to NATO 15% 22% 
Source: The English newspapers used were the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star; 
the French newspapers were Le Devoir and La Presse. 
Finally, our third point merely corroborates the recent 
work of Don Munton (1983f 4) on Canadians' negative view of the 
superpowers - in this regard, see Munton's 1985 survey published 
on behalf of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 
Toronto, and, more particularly, Peace and Security in the i98os: 
The View of Canadians (Munton 1988). In our study, during the 
Diefenbaker era, 10% of MPs held a negative view of the USA, 
whereas the figure was 83°/o for the USSR. In the Trudeau years, 30% 
of those questioned held a negative view of the USSR, and 22% held 
a negative view of the USA. Both superpowers were considered, for 
all practical purposes, to be troublemakers - if not warmongers. 
These figures on Canadian public opinion are obviously much lower 
than those obtained by Munton (80% and over), but it goes without 
saying that the House of Commons is not necessarily the best place 
to express one's resentment toward the USA. What is significant is 
the fact that the superpowers were eventually seen as more or less 
jointly responsible for the arms race and the renewed Cold Warin 
the early 198os. 
There are clear differences of opinion between the 
Commons debates and the press in general. In some ways, the press 
was curiously more conservative than MPs about Canada's military 
alliances and its participation in NATO. The Atlantic Alliance, fur-
thermore, was seen as the best means for Canada to "make its voice 
heard" in the international system, for both periods under consid-
eration - for the two periods, the values were about equal: 20.5% 
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and 2i.8%. lt is important to emphasize that, generally speaking, the 
press reflected the "peace-security" dichotomy better than did par-
liamentary opinion. 
These conclusions are obviously surprising: while pa.rt of a 
military alliance and openly stating that it wished to defend demo-
cratic values, Canada was clearly distancing itself from the super-
powers. Everything would seem to indicate that Canada had always 
been reluctant to participate in military alliances,1 as they contra-
dicted its natural penchant toward "peace by right." The history of 
NATO negotiations while the UN was in astate ofparalysis explains 
the Canadian dichotomy very well: not being able to create a world 
that corresponded to its ideals, Canada finally had to chose what, 
at the time, it considered the lesser of two evils. 
lt is difficult to establish the relative importance of such 
variables as institutions, political parties, pressure groups, public 
opinion, and the media. 2 Where public opinion is concerned, things 
often change very quickly. Surveys conducted by Environics of 
Toronto demonstrate that Canadians do not feel threatened mili-
tarily. In December 1988, the problems considered most important 
were unemployment, free trade, and pollution, ail well ahead of 
global conflict in order of importance; the military role Canadians 
preferred was that of peacekeeper (40%), followed by defending 
Canada against an attack (29%) and policing borders and coastlines 
(15%). For people with a university education, the most serious 
threat to humanity was pollution. From 1983 to 1988, on the other 
band, over 50% of Canadians were worried about the possibility of 
nuclear war. However, although 39% thought that a nuclear war 
within the next 10 years was a possibility, 58% felt the likelihood 
of such an event actually occurring was small or nonexistent. 
By the fall of 1989, according to Environics, 47% of Canadians felt 
i Although Canada took part in World War I out of loyalty to the British Empire and 
in World War II for geoeconomic reasons related toits links with the USA, Canadians 
as a whole are not fond of military matters or, in the words of the lamented John 
Holmes, of "The Bomb," that is, nuclear armament. 
2 For example, is the media more important than the MPs in shaping public opinion, 
or are the political parties more influential than the political platform put forward by 
the party leader? 
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that pollution constituted the most serious threat to humanity; 
30% thought that the threat could be a disease such as AIDS, 
and only 19% believed it would be the possibility of a nuclear war 
(Adams 1989: 5). 
It is also very likely that an analysis of the front pages of 
today's newspapers would make us draw the same conclusions. 
Headlines are constantly about pollution, the environment, drug 
control, terrorism, or the dangers of global warming. Generally 
speaking, public opinion is consistent with the counter-cultural view 
of the main issues concerning the basic survival of our planet. The 
press elite remains more conservative than MPs on the questions of 
military security perse, while the latter are chiefly concerned with 
maintaining a highly regulated and peaceful international system. 
As far as the Commons debates are concerned, there has certainly 
been an increase in "democratization" in this regard, and in the 
House, as elsewhere, the three principal models for the study of 
international relations are now fully part of our culture. 
The debate has taken a new turn in the USA following the 
publication in 1989 of Francis Fukuyama's article "The End of 
History" in the magazine National Interest to which Strobe Talbott 
(1989) gave a scathing reply in Time. Both sides are obviously right, 
with the small qualification, however, that neither approach is des-
tined to disappear, and that the debate has probably just started. 
Chapter 4 
The End of Nonsense and the Beginning of History? 
We couldjust as well invert the ideas of Fukuyama and Talbott, and 
ask ourselves whether the relative "peace epidemic" of 1989, and 
the increased attention given to environmental problems in official 
statements and communiques, mark the end of an era (the Cold 
War) and the beginning of a new period of history in which coop-
eration among former adversaries will create a more harmonious 
situation for the individual and the environment. 
We would, thus, gradually return to the situation that 
should have existed in 1945, but which the reversai of alliances and 
ideological heterogeneity made impossible. Pushing this argument 
toits logical outcome, one could even say that the Cold War made 
the world lose almost 45 years of history (hence the title used for 
this chapter: "The End of Nonsense"). As for inverting the titles of 
the two articles, there is no use claiming that, with the graduai 
spread of democratization of political regimes ail over the world, a 
new form of history is born, although the old and the new are both 
still very much present. The "Beijing Spring" failed, wars continue 
to wreak havoc throughout the world, nationalism is on the rise 
almost everywhere, and crimes against the individual, minorities, 
and ethnie groups are just as frequent today as they probably were 
in the past. If a new era is beginning, it is characterized rather by 
changes in East-West and North-South relations and the shared 
awareness that we are now inhabiting the same planet, whatever 
the price we have to pay to convince ourselves that the Earth is 
indeed round. We share the same problems and we must begin to 
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find solutions to structural inequalities before the end of the century 
if social justice is to be realized. 
A great deal has been written on East-West relations and 
on the nonsense of the arms race between the superpowers and the 
astronomical sums that have been spent on it in the past. Since 1968, 
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) has been 
making a complete inventory of military spending throughout the 
world. Since 1959, the IISS (International Institute of Strategic 
Studies) has dealt with the same problems in its annual publica-
tions. The UN has published several reports on the issue of the eco-
nomic and social consequences of disarmament, as well as on the 
links that should exist between disarmament and development. 
We return later to these problems, on which the inter-
national community is far from reaching a consensus. The same 
holds true for the various theories behind the arms race, which 
are based on everything from structural causes related to the inter-
national system (weapons being merely the reflection of more 
intense international conflicts)1 to interna! causes affecting both 
the military-industrial complex (Yarmolinsky 1971) and the race 
for technological superiority. This does not include the "action-
reaction" behaviorist model, where the action of one party results 
almost necessarily in a reflex action from the other (works by 
Michael P. Wallace are especially revealing in this regard; see for 
example Wallace 1979). It would certainly be easy, based on the 
literature available, to show that a wide variety of causes have been 
responsible for the arms race between the superpowers · - there 
are several models of analysis here: for a more in-depth review, see 
Luterbacher (1975) and Moll and Luebbert (1g80). 
Over and above these concerns, however, is the increas-
ingly obvious fact that 45 years of the arms race has not made the 
world safer than it was in 1945. Former President Kennedy 
described this situation very well when, in the early 196os, he said 
that after 20 years of the arms race, the world was "neither more 
t The entire theory of the realist and neorealist school of international relations is 
based on this premise. 
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nor less secure" than before. The Palme Commission document 
(1982), Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival, as well as the 
Commission's most recent report (1989), clearly sets out the main 
subjects explored: "common security through the rule of law"; 
"common security through economic development, social justice 
and protection of the planet"; and the need to take action so that 
common security gradually replaces "the expediency of nuclear 
deterrence by arms" (Palme Commission 1989: 6, 8, and 27). No more 
elegant way could be found to emphasize the importance of the last 
two of the three models we have described and, in so doing, focus 
on the pressing need to limit the most destructive aspects of "peace 
by might." 
Concerning national security, absolute security for one 
nation brings absolute insecurity for the other. As mentioned by 
John Sigler (1989), quoting an article in the New York Times, "the 
behaviour of the strong invariably determines the ambitions of the 
weak." This maxim has ne ver been truer than when applied to the 
East-West problem and the need to ensure European security. 
Immediately after World War II and in the early195os, the West used 
its ingenuity to counteract the numerical superiority of the Warsaw 
Pact countries. Tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe. 
The USSR then followed suit, with the result that no one in the West 
seriously considered raising the stakes, 2 the Germans being 
absolutely convinced that these weapons could not be used. ln the 
late 197os, when the USSR in turn decided to increase its efforts and 
deploy its SS-2os (the first were deployed in 1g77). the West 
responded by installing the Pershing II and the cruise missile on 
European soil. After all this effort, the two sides agreed in late 1987 
to sign the first intermediate nuclear forces (INF) agreement, which 
would be ratified at the Moscow summit in late May and early June 
of 1988. Reason thus triumphed over technological instability, and 
it may now be possible to speak of "the end of nonsense." 
2 The only exceptions dating back to Presidential Directive (PD)-59 and various 
resulting policies, such as follow-on forces attack (FOFA) and other doctrines intended 
to be used to confront the USSR in wartime with a "risk of maximum survival"; however, 
these concepts today are rapidly becoming obsolete. 
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The bilateral talks on how to reduce friction in the Third 
World, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and of 
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, the improvement in Sino-Soviet 
relations, the signing of agreements on the reduction of conven-
tional forces in November 1990, and the signature of a strategic arms 
reduction talks (ST ART) agreement in July 1991 ail signal the begin-
nings of a transition period in which conflict will gradually be 
replaced by cooperation. We no longer talk of detente, a term that 
was publicly condemned under the Reagan administration, but of a 
positive climate of East-West cooperation, especially as regards 
economic matters. 
It is very likely that the beginning of the end of nonsense 
will also be reflected in global military spending. It is useful here to 
examine what has happened over the past 25 years because, ifthere 
is a meaning to history, the area of Inilitary spending has been the 
most disastrous for both industrialized and developing countries. 
We first look at changes in global spending, and then exainine devel-
opments in North-South arms trade. 
Chapter 5 
Economie Growth and World Military Spending 
Despite arguments on the use of the gross national product (GNP) 
as a measure ofwealth and economic growth, this universally rec-
ognized criterion is used here to measure the increase in world eco-
nomic growth from 1965 to 1988.1 We used the same indicator to 
measure growth in world military spending for the same period: the 
ratio of military spending to GNP. Ali data are in 1978 constant US 
dollars. For the most recent period, 1989-1990, we could only rely 
on general trends, mostly measured in current dollars. This pro-
vides only a gross general approximation of the situation, given the 
erratic inflation rates of several countries. 
Although the world GNP certainly rose in absolute terms 
from 1965 to 1988 [Figure il, average increases for each of the 
successive 5-year periods under consideration actually declined. 
The overall economic growth rate was 5.7% for the entire period 
[Table 41. but over the same period, military spending rose 
7.4% on average, leading us to conclude that military expenditures 
were disproportionately higher than economic wealth. 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, curves for economic growth 
and military spending were fairly similar, which, as several econo-
mists have emphasized, indicates that military spending is a func-
tion of economic growth. 2 
1 Ail statistical data for this chapter and those concerning arms transfers were gath-
ered under the supervision of Daniel Doyon and Cheryl Jones. 
2 From 1965 to 1988, world GNP rose from $5.2 to $12 trillion (1978 constant us dollars), 
while over the same period world military spending rose from $0.33 to $0.58 trillion, 
peaking in 1984 at $0.61 trillion (see Appendix and Supplement 1). However, the growth 
of military spending declined in the period 1985-1988. 











1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Figure 1. World gross national product (GNP), 1965-1988 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Supplement 1. 
Table 4. Average rates of growth (%)for GNP, 
military spending, and population. 
Military 
GNP spending Population 
1966-1969 5.5 6.9 1.9 
1970-1974 12.5 12.6 2.0 
1975-1979 3.8 6.4 1.8 
1980-1984 2.7 10.5 2.0 
1985-1988 3.7 1.3 3.7 
1966-1988 5.7 7.4 2.3 
Source: Supplements 2, 3, and 22A. 
If we break down world military spending by region, 
Eastern Europe spent the most on arms in absolute terms, followed 
by the USA and Western Europe [Figure 3]. Ifwe admit that military 
spending by Eastern Europe is mainly supported by the USSR, we 
can conclude that, although the USSR's spending curve is continu-
ous and growing rapidly, that of the USA is U-shaped, bottoming out 
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Figure 2. World military spending, 1965-1988 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Appendix. 
~ Eastern Europe -.. North America 
---+--- Western Europe ---o-- Asia 
1985 
1970 1975 1980 1985 
Figure 3. Military spending by regions, 1965-1988: North America, 
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Appendix. 
The breakdown in East-West military spending is reveal-
ing in several regards. Three important conclusions can be drawn 
from Table 5. First, the military spending of the NATO countries has 
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Table 5. East-West military spending 
(in millions of 1978 constant us dollars). 
1965 1975 1985 1988 1965-1988 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
North America 107 105 111 920 163 036 179 013 3 226 635 
Western Europe 66 638 80 880 92 362 98 552 1 983 242 
Total NATO 173 743 192 800 255 398 277 565 5 209 877 
Warsaw Pact (WP) 
USSR 103 823 151 381 165 416 161 743 3 502 504 
Eastern Europe 16 244 21133 25 855 34 424 528 464 
Total WP 120 067 172 514 191 271 196 167 4 030 968 
Ratios 
USA/Western Europe 1.6:1 1.3:1 1.7:1 1.8:1 1.6:1 
USSR/Eastern Europe 6.4:1 7.2:1 6.4:1 4.7:1 6.6:1 
NATO/WP 1.4:1 1.1:1 1.1:1 1.4:1 1.3:1 
Source: Appendix. 
always exceeded that of the Warsaw Pact. For 1965-1988, the ratio 
is 1.29:1 in favour of the NATO countries, with the weakest point 
in 1975. 
Second, for all intents and purposes, the USSR alone carried 
the cost of the arms race in the Eastern Bloc. In contrast, the defence 
burden was much more equitably shared in the western alliance 
than in the eastern one [Table 5]. For 1965-1988, the USSR spent 
6.6 times more than its allies in Eastern Europe, the ratio increas-
ing to 7.2 times in 1975. In the same period, the USA only showed a 
ratio of 1.63:1 in relation toits NATO allies. 
Third, if we examine the relationship between the USA and 
Western Europe, we see that the burden was more equitably shared 
in 1975 than in 1965, 1985, or 1988. ln fact, in 1988, the USA's share 
was almost twice as high as that of Western Europe, which is a good 
indication of how Europeans seem to perceive the threat from the 
East. This could only revive the debate in Washington over a more 
equitable division of responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance. 
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Figure 4. Military spending by regions, 1965-1988: 
Africa, Central America, South America, and Oceania 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Appendix. 
gradually reduce their military spending, the latter perhaps more 
quickly than the former. Such conditions would not make it easy to 
maintain large numbers of US troops in Europe. 
As far as the other regions are concerned,3 Asia and the 
Middle East constitute by far the two most important. The sudden 
rise in Asia's military spending curve between 1975 and 1980 [see 
Figure 3] was attributable mainly to the increase in the military 
expenditures of the People's Republic of China .. Far behind these 
two regions corne Africa, South America, Oceania, and Central 
America [Figure 4]. 4 
3 These include Africa, Central America, South America, Asia, the Middle East, and 
Oceania. Ali tables and graphs are based on the following particulars: the North 
includes the industrialized countries, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand; the South 
includes what are usually considered the southern countries, minus Japan and 
Oceania. In the regional breakdowns, however, Asia includes Japan. For further 
details, see Supplement 24, which lists the regions and their respective countries. 
4 In 1988, military spending for these regions amounted to $5.6. $5.1, $4·4· and $1.1 
billion (!978 constant US dollars) respectively, as compared with $74 and $17 billion for 
Asia and the Middle East, respectively. The substantial decline in military spending by 
these last two regions since 1985 is, in part, the result of a statistical aberration: the 
major devaluation of the US dollar in 1985. 
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If we consider the total figures for world GNP and military 
spending for the en tire 1965-1988 period [Table 6], we note a remark-
able stability in the North-South relationship iil these variables, at 
least in terms of absolute values. Thus, the North accounts for about 
82% of world GNP and military spending, and the South for about 
17%. What we have here is almost a sustained world balance. 
Table 6. World gross national product (GNP) and military spending. 
Ratio 
World North South North:South 
GNP (trillions of 197 8 constant US dollars) 
1965 5.16 4.43 (85.8)a 0.73 (14.2) 6.07:1 
1975 8.11 6.73 (83.0) 1.37 (17.0) 4.88:1 
1985 10.94 8.78 (80.3) 2.16 (19.7) 4.06:1 
1988 11.75 9.34 (79.5) 2.41 (20.5) 3.88:1 
1965-88 205.7 169.0 (82.2) 36.7 (17.8) 4.60:1 
Military Spending (billions of 1978 constant US dollars) 
1965 328.2 300.6 (91.6) 27.6 (8.4) 10.88:1 
1975 462.1 376.0 (81.4) 86.1 (18.6) 4.36:1 
1985 576.0 464.2 (80.5) 111.8 (19.5) 4.12:1 
1988 581.0 493.1 (84.9) 87.9 (15.1) 5.61:1 
1965-88 11 529.3 9 530.7 (82.6) 1 998.6 (17.3) 4.77:1 
Increase (%) 1966-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-88 1966-88 
GNP 
North 5.3 4.2 3.0 1.9 2.7 3.4 
South 4.2 8.7 5.3 4.5 1.9 5.2 
Military spending 
North 4.6 0.7 1.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 
South 9.2 15.9 3.2 12.7 7.3 7.2 
Source: Appendix and Supplements 1, 2,and 3. 
a Values in parentheses are percentages of world value. 
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A closer look, however, reveals that this is not the case at 
all because, from 1966 to 1988, the increase in the South's GNP (5.2%) 
was much higher than that of the North (3.4%). Thus, for the first 
four 5-year periods under consideration, we can see the North's 
global GNP gradually declined, whereas the South's GNP rose 
steadily, except for the 1985-1988 period. Average increases in mil-
itary spending in the South were also extremely high between 1966 
and 1988. Generally speaking, ignoring statistical aberrations, there 
is no doubt that military spending in the South increased more 
rapidly than it did in the North for the period under consideration, 
and that the South made definite economic progress, putting the 
North in a position of relative decline - for the entire 1966-1988 
period, the North's military spending rose 2.2%, as compared with 
7.2% for the South. 
We can obviously ask who benefited from this transfer of, 
or increase in, wealth at the South-South level. Table 7 provides the 
main answers to that question. The only significant figures are obvi-
ously those for Asia, which in 22 years practically doubled its share 
of the world GNP. Japan and China obviously benefited most from 
this transfer of, or increase in, wealth. It would seem that, since 
1985, figures for South America and Africa have risen only slightly, 
while those for Central America and the Middle East have experi-
enced a slight downturn. 
Changes in world military spending patterns are dramatic. 
In 1965, figures for the North and South were 91.6% and 8.4% of the 
Table 7. Share (%) of world gross nation product (GNP) 
by region (1965, 1985, and 1988). 
1965 1985 1988 
Asia 13.20 22.61 24.90 
South America 3.27 3.62 3.70 
Africa 2.24 1.79 2.01 
Central America 1.13 1.28 1.16 
Middle East 1.35 2.41 1.82 
Source: Supplement 4. 
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world total respectively; however, in 1985, they were 80.5% and 
19.5% (from Supplement 5, World). In 1988, the South accounted for 
17.3% ofworld spending, whereas the North reached 82.8%. 
In relative terms, the South's military growth was very 
rapid in the early 197os and 198os (see Supplement 3), but slow 
toward the late 197os and negative in the latter half of the 198os 
(5.3%). Statistics also show that, between 1985 and 1988, despite the 
fact that military spending rose slightly in the North and fell in the 
South, there was a relative decline in world military spending. 
Table 8 indicates the relative importance ofvarious regions 
with respect to world military spending (from Supplement 5). This 
table merely confirms what we already know, that most regions are 
relatively stable, with the exception of Asia, whose share of world 
military spending doubled in the space of 20 years. Figures for the 
Middle East are gradually returning to normal, falling between 1985 
and1988 from 5.6% to 2.9%. 
Furthermore, if we consider the often-used ratio of mili-
tary spending to GNP for the world as a whole, the futile and massive 
diversion of a portion ofnational wealth toward purely military ends 
is cause for concern. Military spending in the long term cannot help 
but contribute to the poverty of the South in relation to the North, 
especially if a major imbalance between military spending and 
GNP occurs to the same degree in both hemispheres. In this regard, 
Table 9 shows the major trends that occurred from 1965 to 1988 
(see Supplement 6). 
Table 8. Share (%) of world military spending 
by region (1965, 1985, and 1988). 
1965 1985 
Asia 6.34 14.19 
Middle East 1.30 5.56 
Africa 0.67 0.59 
South America 1.02 1.18 
Oceania 1.00 0.78 
Central America 0.15 0.25 
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Table 9. Ratio(%) of military spending 
to world gross national product (1965, 1970, 1985, and 1988). 
1965 1970 1985 1988 
World 3.97 4.37 5.15 4.44a 
North 6.78 6.34 5.28 4.52a 
South 3.77 6.10 5.22 4.37a 
Middle East 6.55 9.89 13.77 7.75 
Oceania 3.23 2.65 2.47 2.62 
Africa 1.85 2.67 3.02 2.29 
Asia 3.84 4.33 4.92 2.46 
South America 2.04 1.98 2.72 1.14 
Central America 1.24 2.11 1.03 0.78 
Source: Supplement 6. 
a 1987 values. 
While the world spent almost 4% ofits GNP on arms in 1965, 
the figure was 5.1% by 1985 and 4.4% in 1987. This increase was 
largely the result of the South's massive purchases of weapons. 
From the early 197os to 1985, the South showed a slightly higher rate 
of military spending, at least as far as the ratio of military spend-
ing to GNP was concerned (see Supplement 6, World). This proves, 
once again, the theory of growing militarism in the South, a trend 
that is obvious throughout the period 1970-1985. 
The leader here was obviously the Middle East, which 
by 1985 was spending almost double the amount on arms that it had 
in 1965. Over the same period, the North reduced its military spend-
ing slightly in relation to its GNP, as did Central America; Asia's 
share went up one percentage point; and Africa, a continent with 
very low revenues, practically doubled the amount of its military 
spending in relation to its meagre GNP. An improvement of the 
overall situation appeared in the mid-198os; since 1985, only Oceania 
of ail the regions has been spending a greater portion of its 
financial resources on arms. These recent trends are obviously 
encouraging. Since 1987, in fact, the South has been spending 4.4% 
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of its GNP on arms, as compared with 5.2% in 1985. This was the 
beginning of progress that continued in 1988 and 1989. Given their 
massive debts, the countries of the world appear to be making a 
virtue out of necessity! 
Figure 5 illustrates the covariation of the curves for 
North-South economic growth and military spending. Strangely 
enough, however, while in the 197os economic growth began to rise 
faster than military spending in the North, the opposite was gener-
ally true for the South. The situation was reversed in 1985; however, 
this was the result of a statistical aberration attributable to the 
devaluation of the dollar that artificially inflated data for the South, 
and deflated those for the North. 
The fact that military spending is probably better managed 
in the North than in the South is doubtless the only logical expla-
nation for this phenomenon (in this regard, see Kupchan (1989); 
if this theory is true for the countries of the North, it is even more 
so for the countries of the South). Actually, there may be another 
logical explanation as well, but one that is hardly reassuring. The 
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Figure 5. North and South shares (%) of world 
gross national product (GNP) and military spending (MS). 
Source: Supplements 4 and 5. 
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North has not overtaxed its economic development by committing 
itself to military expenditures, whereas the contrary might be true 
for the South: there may be an element oftruth in ail this. However, 
studies have shown that, for the countries of the Organisation for 
Economie Co-operation and Development (OECD) at least, it is prob-
ably more certain that military spending can only increase to the 
detriment of domestic spending. Whatever explanation we choose, 
it only shows the growing burden ofmilitary spending by the South 
in relation to its economy. 
Chapter 6 
Arms Transfers 
Arms transfers must be distinguished from contracts for the pur-
chase, acquisition, or assignment of arms. The former may take 
place, or mày even be cancelled, several years after a contract is 
signed and often under political conditions that are different from 
those under which the original negotiations took place (see Klare 
1984; the distinction is also valid for arms agreements). As far as 
statistics are concerned, however, analysts must rely on the esti-
mated or officially quoted value of arms that have actually been 
transferred.1 
Most arms transfers involve government action, although 
a sman percentage represents private transactions between 
vendors and purchasers. For the USA, these figures vary between 
Bo and 90% for the government, and between 10 and 20% for the 
private sector (see Klare 1988: 75). However, according to certain 
observers, the black market in arms is apparently playing an 
Jncreasingly large role in international dealings, "Irangate" being 
only one aspect of this epiphenomenon. This would, therefore, tend 
to distort official statistics - Klare (1989: 46) estimates this market 
to be worth between $5 and $10 billion per year. Furthermore, arms 
transfers are dependent on the evolution of conflicts throughout 
the world, on many factors relating to the status, prestige, and 
1 The statistics used here end with those for 1988, the last year included in the offi-
cial 1g89 publication of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (ACDA r990). The more recent statistics have 
been taken from the SIPRI annual yearbooks on world armaments and disarmament, 
and have occasionally been converted to 1978 constant us dollars. 
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particular ambitions of a given country (the case of Libya is espe-
cially interesting - see Gongora (1989)), and on a range of domes-
tic policy considerations that are the product of permissiveness, 
restraint, or the strictest control. In most cases, and in the USA in 
particular, transfer policies fall under the executive bran ch of gov-
ernment. 2 Other institutions certainly have their say, especially as 
regards direct constraints (legislation, for example) and indirect 
constraints (regular or special Congressional reports, for example), 
but arms transfers are largely the domain of the executive bran ch 
of government in the foreign affairs arena. 
Most commentators are, therefore, correct in saying that 
many problems in this area may be solved through future multi-
1 ater al negotiations. Andrew Pierre of the Council on Foreign 
Relations insists on the importance of supplier-initiated, regionally 
oriented talks, while others suggest that the purchasing countries 
also be involved in such discussions (Pierre 1982: 310; Ohlson 1988: 
242). Among the numerous other suggestions aimed at limiting arms 
transfers, we should note the levying of a special tax on arms sales, 
the establishment of a watchdog agency similar or comparable in 
its functioning to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 
Vienna, the establishment of an official register for arms trans-
ferred, the creation of a disarmament fund, and all other proposais 
aimed at promoting regional peace and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes (Fontanel and Guilhaudis 1988; Simpson 1988). 
Brzoska and Ohlson (1987) distinguish four main phases in 
the evolution of arms transfers. The first phase corresponds largely 
to the "donation" stage, which extended from the early 195os to the 
mid-196os when the superpowers tried to support their respective 
allies in strategically important geopolitical are as. 
2 Government transactions are administered by the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency (DSAA) through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) pro gram, whereas private con-
tracts go through the State Department's Office of Munitions Contrai (OMC). Military 
transfers are subject to the i976 Arms Export Contra! Act and its instrument of enforce-
ment, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). For the various methods of 
administrative contrai over arms transfers in France, the Federal Republic ofGermany, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, see Allebeck (1989). 
Arms Transfers • 37 
The second phase marked the beginnings of tracte per se, with 
exported weapons becoming increasingly sophisticated, Europe 
decreasing its military spending, and the Third World increasing its 
purchases. This period began toward the mid-196os and preceded 
the rapid expansion in military exports that occurred during the 
197os. Several factors explain this phenomenon, in particular: 
The coming to power of the Nixon administration, which 
discontinued the restrictive policy practiced by Kennedy 
and Johnson; 
The 1973 October War, which made the price of oil sky-
rocket and obliged several countries to recycle their petro-
dollars; 
The sudden intervention in the arms market of the USSR, 
which was in pursuit ofhard currency and increased influ-
ence in the Third World; 
The need felt by several countries to renew their supply of 
military equipment, which dated from the 194os and 195os 
(this cycle cornes into play, on average, every 15-20 years); 
and 
The rapid proliferation ofregional conflicts throughout the 
world. 
The third phase began in the late 197os and ended with the eco-
nomic recession of 1983. Its main characteristics were: 
The arrivai of European newcomers on an increasingly 
competitive international market; 
The growing militarization of several Third World coun-
tries, fueled by the economic crisis and the instability of 
their political institutions; 
The hardening of bila ter al strategic relations following the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; and 
The exacerbation of several regional conflicts (lndia-
Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, andArgentina and Chile), which would 
provide the USSR with the opportunity to provide massive 
support to Angola and Ethiopia, and the USA with an unex-
pected pretext to approve the sale of AWACS (airborne 
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warning and control system) aircraft to Saudi Arabia; 
F-16 fighters to Pakistan, South Korea, and Venezuela; 
AH-1 helicopters to Jordan; and E-2c airborne early 
warning aircraft to Singapore. 
The fourth phase began toward the mid-198os. This phase coincided 
with the export of the most sophisticated systems to date, such as 
the MiG-29s destined for Syria and India even before they had been 
put into service in the Soviet air force. It also coincided with the 
development of new long-term financial policies and occasionally 
with the write-off of old debts in exchange for the purchase of new 
military equipment, such as the Al Thakeb antiaircraft defence con-
tract between France and Saudi Arabia. This phase also included 
the implementation of an increasing number of joint-production 
agreements, some of which provided for industrial compensation 
for domestic industries and others that contained clauses on tech-
nology transfer, the training of military personnel, production 
under licence, and marketing conditions. 
The appearance ofnew weapon producers in the countries 
of the South, such as Argentina and Brazil, and also India, Israel, 
South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, seems to coïncide with this 
fourth phase. The new manufacturers were responsible for nearly 
8% of arms transfers during the first half of the 198os and nearly 
10% during the second half (ACDA 1990). The end of the Iran-Iraq 
War, the growing debt load of the South, and the Gulf War, which 
enabled the USA to reestablish its superiority, are potential fac-
tors that could further reduce advantages enjoyed by the South's 
producers. 
Toda y, we are entering what is perhaps a fifth phase, espe-
cially given the joint production agreement for the FS-X fighter (also 
called the SX-3) signed by Japan and the USA, both of whom want 
to specialize in high technology. On the bilateral level, it would seem 
that both sides are beginning to understand the need for arresting 
the costly spiral of the arms race between the superpowers and 
reducing their rivalries in the Third World. Furthermore, military 
exports have clearly been declining for several years, and it is 
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possible that only the ri ch countries in the Middle East and Asia may 
continue to refurbish their military arsenals with high technology 
weapons in the future. 
Exporting countries 
Ifwe deal only with net arms exporters,3 in absolute volume, arms 
transfers from 1965 to 1988 amounted to $472 billion (1978 constant 
US dollars). Of all the transfers in question, 24 % occurred between 
1965 and 1974 ($111.3 billion), 53% between 1975 and 1984 ($252.2 
billion), and 23% between 1985and1988 ($108.5 billion). The increase 
in arms transfers between 1975 and 1985 is even more impressive 
when one considers it does not include the small producers such as 
Bulgaria, Egypt, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, or 
Saudi Arabia (Supplement 7). The most significant increases in 
military trade took place in the early and late 197os; the early 198os 
(1980-1984) saw the largest increases ever (more than 12%); but in 
1985-1988, growth rate was negative (Supplement 8). 
Figure 6 provides a very clear indication of general trends 
in the gross monetary value of arms exports. Although, in 1965, the 
arms trade accountedfor $7·4 billion per year, by 1985 it represented 
$27-4 billion. The highest point was reached in 1984, with record 
sales of $34.6 billion. In 1986, the arms market fell to the lowest 
point of the decade ($25.2 billion), but rose in 1988 to $28.6 billion 
(in 1978 constant us dollars). 
During the 20-year period under consideration (1965-1985), 
the major powers accounted for two-thirds of arms exported. The 
suppliers ranked as follows: USSR (35.5%), USA (31.2%), France 
(9.8%), and the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany (4.5% each). However, between 1980and1985, the figures 
for the same countries were 36%, 21%, 14%, 5%, and 6%, respec-
tively; this indicates the important role played by the USSR during 
this period and the relative decline in that played by the USA. This 
3 That is, the following 14 countries: Austria, Brazil, Canada, the People's Republic 
of China, Czechoslovakia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the USA, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. 
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Figure 6. Monetary value of arms exports, 1965-1988 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Supplement 7. 
decline was counterbalanced by the increased importance of the 
major European suppliers, with France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and the United Kingdom alone accounting for 25% of the 
market. Also to be noted is the appearance of new producers such 
as the developing countries, Brazil, China, and India. 
For the period 1985-1988, four powers shared $108.5 billion 
of arms transfers in the following proportions: USSR 40.7%, USA 
26.3%, China 10.2%, and France 9.2%. These four countries alone 
exported 86% of the military equipment transferred during this 
period. 
Figure 7 shows the predominance of the USA during the 
Cold War. From 1973, with the Yom Kippur War, the USSR caught 
up with the USA and, during the same period, the European coun-
tries started to make their presence felt in the arms market. 
Figure 8 shows the overall monetary value of military 
exports for the five leading suppliers between 1975 and 1988. The 
USSR began to take the lead in 1977 with sales fluctuating between 
$11 and $12 billion (1978 constant us dollars), with the exception of 
1985. ln the late 197os, China and France began to play an increas-
ingly significant role to the point that, in 1988, China ranked third 
among exporters, immediately after the USSR and the USA. In 1988, 
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Figure 7. Five leading arms-exporting countries, 1965-1975 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Supplement 7. 
China's share in the arms traffic was estimated at $11.1 billion (in 1978 
constant us dollars). In 1989, France regained third place, while 
China lost ground as a result of the Iran-Iraq War [see SlPRI 1990: 
220 - SIPRI data are calculated in 1985 constant us dollars and are 
not based on the same criteria; the ranking order, however, remains 
undoubtedly the same]. The sales of the USA, the USSR, and China 
decreased, in 1989, to $11.2 billion, $7 .7 billion, and $1.1 billion respec-
tively.4 In 1990, another slight decrease in arms sales will, most 
probably, be recorded, with an accelerated revival in 1991 as a result 
of the GulfWar. The USA will clearly take a leading position in this 
increase. 
SIPRI figures indicate that, between 1985 and 1989, arms 
transfers to the Third World were 1.5 times as high as those among 
industrialized countries ($106 billion in North-South transfers as 
4 See editorial in New York Times of2 March 1991 (p. 22) citing figures from the report 
by Richard Grimmett of the Congressional Research Service (CRS). These figures are 
obviously in current dollars, which makes the decrease even more drastic (possibly 
25%), if converted to 1978 constant dollars. For China, see Time of 22 April 1991 (p. 39). 
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Figure 8. Five leading arms-exporting countries, 1975-1988 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Supplement 7. 
compared with $67 billion in transfers among the industrialized 
countries, in 1985 constant us dollars: see SIPRI 1990: 220). During 
this time, the lion's share of North-South transfers obviously 
involved the five major powers. The USSR accounted for 43.8% of the 
market, the USA for 20.2%, China for lI.6%, France for 6.3%, and the 
United Kingdom for 5.3%. Next came the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy, at 1.8% and 1.6% respectively. Preliminary data 
for 1989 indicate that, for France alone, orders for arms dropped 
by 40% - orders for 1989 appear to have represented between 
23 and 25 billion francs, as compared with 37 .5 billion francs for 1988 
(see Le Monde, 4-5 March 1990 (p. 16)). This trend will probably 
become more pronounced in the future, as the USA is undoubtedly 
playing a predominant role in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf Crisis 
(see Le Monde of 29 September 1990 (p. 13) reporting contracts of 
more than $2 billion between Saudi Arabia and the USA for the 
next 2 years). 
Lastly, we should note that a major portion of military aid 
to Israel and Egypt has taken the form of donations. According to 
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the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 1989), almost 
$13 billion worth of arms were transferred this way to the Middle 
East from 1985 to 1988. Of this total, $5 billion worth went to Egypt 
and $6.7 billion to Israel. The Middle East received almost 87% of all 
US aid given in the form of donations for this period. 
The proportion of arms sales to total exports for the 
1970-1988 period is 24% of the exports of net arms-exporting coun-
tries. The highest rate of total military exports was reached in the 
1985-1988 period, at 3.5% (see Supplement 9). If the imperialism 
theorywere still in vogue today, there would be no difficulty describ, 
ing the USSR and China as the main perpetrators of such military 
imperialism. For the 1985-1988 period alone, the proportion of mil-
itary sales to total exports for the two countries was 20.8% and 5.9%, 
respectively (see Supplement 9). For the six leading exporters, the 
situation is shown in Table 10. 
It is difficult to identify at exactly what point military tracte 
significantly begins to distort national economies, but the USSR was 
clearly a phenomenon in itself, even if it could be explained by the 
Kremlin's desire for hard currency. The same type of argument may 
also be applied to China. Generally speaking, the late l98os and early 
l99os seem to presage a difficult and delicate situation. It will be 
difficult because, apart from the strong competition among them, 
the major exporters will also have to confront significant break-
throughs into the arms market by the new producers from the 
Table 10. Military trade as percentage of total exports 
for six leading arms-exporting countries. 
1970-1988 1980-1984 1985-1988 
USSR 12.8 12.0 20.8 
China 4.8 3.0 5.9 
USA 4.4 4.1 4.3 
Czechoslovakia 4.3 4.7 4.4 
Yugoslavia 1.7 1.0 3.3 
France 1.6 1.1 3.9 
Source: Supplement 9. 
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South. The situation will also become delicate, partly because of the 
significant surplus occurring in the Western and Eastern arsenals 
after the East-West reductions, and partly because of the need 
to rearm the countries in the Gulf according to balance-of-power 
principles embraced especially by the USA. Western producers 
must, therefore, move between restraint and competition, between 
arms control and security. Once again, the principle of security 
seems to take precedence over that of reason (see the revealing 
article by Klare (1991b)). 
lmporting countries 
From 1965 to 1988, the value of arms imports for the net importing 
countries as a whole was $342 billion - "net importing countries" 
are those that import more military equipment than they export: 
92 countries (see Supplement io). The majority of these transfers 
(37%) took place between 1980 and 1984 - close to 60% between 
1975 and 1984 and 22% between 1985 and 1988. 
From 1965 to 1988, the six leading recipients were, in 
descending order, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Libya, and India, 
which shows clearly the still-dominant role of the Middle East in the 
arms trade [see Table n]. The Middle East accounted for 50.4% of 
ail arms imports, and for 46.3% of the total arms trade between 1985 
and 1988. Nothing seems to indicate that these figures will change 
in the future, despite the fact that some countries, such as India and 
North Korea, have recently become important importers of military 
equipment. 
Figure 9 and Table n provide a clear picture of the changes 
in the situation in the Middle East. This region clearly dominates ail 
military spending, taking 34% of the arms market throughout the 
period 1965-1988, with Iraq in the leading position. The Iraqi market 
has surpassed the Iranian one since 1980, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
have dominated the market since 1981. The breakdown for the major 
players in the Middle East, from 1965 to 1988 and from 1985 to 1988, 
is shown in Table n. 
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Figure 9. Five leading arms-importing countries, 1975-i988 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Supplement 10. 
It is significant that, for the 1985-1988 period, Iran and Libya 
ranked last among the importing countries of the Middle East, 
whereas Saudi Arabia recaptured its role as a major player in the 
Middle Eastern market, followed by Iraq and Syria. 5 
Between 1984and1988, the main clients of the USSR, accord-
ing to SIPRI (see SIPRI 1989: 208), were Angola, India, Iraq, Libya, and 
Syria; these countries received 75% of all arms exports from the 
USSR. The USA was in a similar situation, with Egypt, Israel, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea receiving 63% of its 
exports. It is noteworthy that India, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia repre-
sented 50% of the French market, and that Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabi a represented 88% of the Chinese market. 
The past few years have seen significant changes, however. lndia, 
5 A recent report by Richard Grimmett of the Congressional Research Service· notes 
the continuing importance of the Middle East in arms purchases from 1982 to 1989. 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq were the two largest importers (s44.2 billion and s42.8 billion 
respectively). Iran placed fourth with s17 billion and Syria fifth with s15.6 billion. During 
this period, the Middle East was responsible for almost 30% of world imports. 
(See editorial in the New York Times of 2 March 1991 (p. 22).) 
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Table 11. Six leading arms-importing countries, world and 
Middle East (ME) markets (billions 1978 constant US$). 
1965-1988 1985-1988 
World ME World ME 
Billions share share Billions share share 
$ (%) (%) $ (%) (%) 
Iraq 30.8 9.0 21.4 5.9 8.0 21.0 
Saudi Arabia 25.6 7.5 17.8 9.2 12.6 33.0 
Iran 20.3 5.9 14.1 2.3 3.2 8.3 
Syria 20.3 5.9 14.1 3.1 4.2 11.0 
Libya 18.8 5.5 13.0 2.0 2.8 7.3 
In dia 18.7 5.5 8.3 11.3 
ME 115.8 33.9 80.4 22.5 30.8 82.1 
World 1 344.5 39.4 30.8 42.1 
Source: Supplements 10 and 10A. 
with 12.7'Yo of the world total, has become, immediately after Saudi 
Arabia, the second arms importer in the world. 
This period has also been characterized by a greater diver-
sification in suppliers: Europe is naturally continuing to corner a 
part of the market that used to be almost a us monopoly, and China 
is following suit, developing special relations with Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. As a result of the Iran-Iraq cease-fire, 
the Iranian demand for arms may decline, although Iran will have 
to rebuild and modernize its armies, and China may return to its 
more traditional clients such as Pakistan and North Korea. 
However, China is not neglecting its relations with the industrial-
ized countries, on whose support it is counting to pursue its efforts 
at modernization. ln the military field, major agreements have 
recently been signed with Australia, France, Italy, and the USA, 
in particular concerning avionics (see SIPRI 1989: 208). 
The recent, more relaxed, climate in international rela-
tions, multilateral efforts to reduce the scale of regional conflicts, 
and the renewed vigour of the UN Security Council are all factors 
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that may cause the arms industries to put pressure on their respec-
tive governments to liberalize military tracte regulations. This 
situation could be favourable to the revival of the bilateral talks on 
limiting arms transfers (the famous "Conventional Arms Transfers 
Talks," or CATT} that were sacrificed on the altar of bureaucratie 
arguments in Washington and became bogged down in total mis-
understanding with Moscow.6 However, judging by what little 
progress has been made in talks aimed at establishing a system for 
controlling missile-related technology transfers,7 we would cer-
tainly be justified in believing that it will be several years before 
effective restraints in this area can be established and the disas-
trous situation of regional conflicts improved. 
Before analyzing the rela.tionships between military spend-
ing and arms transfers, it may be useful to examine (as we did for 
the exporting countries} the ratio ofmilitary imports to total imports 
for the recipient countries. For 1970to1988, military tracte accounted 
for an average of7.4% of ail imports in the net importing countries. 
More recently, for 1980 to 1984, the value reached 8%, and stood at 
7.4% for 1985to1988. 
The most volatile region is clearly the Middle East with mili-
tary imports accounting for 17.5% of ail imports to this region be-
tween 1970and1988. For the more recent period, 1985-1988, the arms 
tracte remained at 17.8% (Supplement 12}. Another noteworthy 
fact is that, for the 1980-1984 period, the percentages for Asia and 
Africa were also very high, 9.0and10.2% respectively (for 1985-1987, 
these figures fell to 5.8 and 5.1%, respectively}. In other words, 
North-South tracte has been undergoing increased militarization 
at the expense of commercial exchanges that could be more advan-
tageous to the economic development of these countries. 
6 In this regard, see Pierre (1982) and Husbands and Cahn (1988). CATT negotiations 
were held in 19n and 1978 between the USSR and the USA, with the latter wishing to 
discuss restraints in arms transfers to Latin America and s ub-Saharan Africa, while 
the USSR wished to include east and west Asia, to the great distress of Presidential 
Adviser Z. Brzezinski. 
7 The purpose of the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regimel talks is to stop the 
proliferation of ballistic vectors capable of transporting "a useful (nuclear) Joad of 
500 kg to within a range of300 km" (see SIPRI 1989: 288). 
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Arms transfers and military spending 
As mentioned by Fontanel and Guilhaudis (1988: 219), although it is 
true that the value of all arms transfers is between3 and 5% ofworld 
military spending,8 this indicator takes on an entirely different 
meaning ifwe apply it to the net importing countries only. For these 
91 countries (Supplement 13), 25% of military spending, on average, 
went toward arms imports, at least for the 1965-1988 period. 
Between 1980 and 1984, military imports represented an average of 
37% of military spending, which illustrates the growing cost of 
equipment in military budgets. Furthermore, this percentage varies 
enormously from region to region and country to country. 
From 1965 to 1988, the proportion of the total military 
budget spent on imported arms for the IO leading countries is shown 
in Table 12 (Supplement 13). Between 1985 and 1g88, three countries 
had military imports that were higher than the overall level oftheir 
military spending: Cyprus (205%), Uganda (117%), and Chad (126%). 
Four other countries spent more than half their military budget 
on purchasing military equipment: Guinea (74%), Jordan (53%), 
Mali (98%), and North Yemen (73%). 
These figures demonstrate that, for most domestic wars, 
the cost ofimported equipment largely exceeds the military budget 
of the countries in question. lt is also a measure of the degree of 
B Our data for the 1965-1988 period (Appendix and Supplements 7 and 10) indicate 
that. for the net exporting countries, military tracte represented 4°/o of world military 
spending and, for the South importing countries. 2.5°/o. 
Table 12. Arms imports as percentage of total military spending 
for top 10 net arms-importing countries, 1965-1988. 
Afghanistan 175.25 Syria 68.40 
Ethiopia 141.25 North Yemen 64.66 
Somali a 131.96 Mali 62.87 
Libya 117.61 Cyprus 56.27 
Bénin 77.34 Chad 53.11 
Source: Supplement 13. 
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their dependence on the outside world. More seriously, however, 
the import ofmilitary equipment puts a strain on the budgets of the 
importing countries and, thus, may have a marked effect on their 
foreign or long-term debt. According to certain sources, 20% of all 
loans granted to the Third World between 1972 and 1982 went 
toward arms purchases (SIPRI 1985: 448). Quoting a study by Brzoska 
("The accumulation of military debt." Research Centre on War, 
Disarmament and Development, Hamburg University, Hamburg, 
Germany. Working Document 7), Ohlson (1988: 8) estimates that 10% 
ofThird World debt is attributable to the purchase ofmilitary equip-
ment. We do not have any figures on debt in constant dollars. 
Percentage of imports represented 
by military equipment 
The ratio of imports of military equipment to a country's total 
imports is doubtless a better indicator of economic vulnerability 
than the relationship between military imports and military spend-
ing. Between 1970 and 1988, military imports accounted for over 10% 
of total imports for the 12 countries shown in Table 13. 
Ail the countries strongly dependent on the outside world, 
that is, those who at some time or other have been at war during 
the 198os, have purchased arms amounting to more than 25% of 
their total imports. These are Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, 
Somalia, and Syria. In recent years, North Korea appears to have 
replaced Libya as a significant military importer. Furthermore, all 
these figures indicate an even more disturbing trend: the ratio of 
military imports to world imports was 7% for the overall 1970-1988 
period, and 8% between 1980 and 1984. For the 1985-1988 period, 
the figure remains very high at 7.4% (all figures have been taken 
from Supplement 12). The Middle and Near East are obviously the 
two regions most severely affected by the phenomenon of milita-
rization in world tracte. Although between 1985 and 1988 the tradi-
tional Middle Eastern buyers were active, there was a new country 
with a relatively high ratio of military equipment imports: India. 
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Table 13. Military imports as percentage of total imports. 
1970-1988 1980-1984 1985-1988 
Ethiopia 64.5 Ethiopia 94.2 Afghanistan 128.2 
Afghanistan 56.0 Afghanistan 71.2 Ethiopia 75.6 
Syria 53.9 Syria 64.4 Nicaragua 57.2 
Somali a 36.2 Iraq 42.0 Iraq 47.8 
Iran 28.7 Somali a 40.9 Syria 40.2 
Iraq 28.3 Libya 35.2 North Korea 24.5 
Libya 24.4 Jordan 24.8 Libya 20.1 
Egypt 22.5 Cuba 18.2 Indiaa 17.7 
North Yemen 20.5 Egypt 14.6 Iran 17.3 
Nicaragua 19.4 North Koreaa 13.5 Saudi Arabiaa 17.0 
North Korea 17.3 Guineaa 12.4 Somalia 16.2 
Jordan 16.7 Congo a 10.2 Jordan 14.2 
Source: Supplement 12. 
a Newly significant military importers. 
Relationship between development assistance and 
military spending 
In absolute terms and in current dollars, assistance rose from 
$10.3 billion in 1965 to $84.8 billion in 1984, reaching a record figure 
of $89.7 billion in 1981 and dropping to $48.9 billion in 1987 
(Supplement 14; current us dollars). The year 1988 was disastrous 
with the level of assistance dropping drastically to $14.3 billion. Not 
since the end of the 196os has such a low level been recorded. 
In 1978 us dollars, cumulative assistance supplied between 
1965 and 1987 amounted to $t.07 trillion (see Supplement 14A), 
$048 trillion of which was provided from 1980 to 1987 only. 
Assistance dropped significantly in the early 198os [Figure 
10]. From 1965 to 1975, the USA bore most of the burden of develop-
ment assistance [Figure n]. Most of the other major industrialized 
countries became fully involved only after the oil crisis of 1973. ln 
1975, the two principal donors were the USA and the Federal 
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Figure 10. Total world aid, 1965-1987 (1978 constant us dollars). 
Source: Supplement 14A. Note: Data are not available for 1988 
but would probably show a marked reduction. 
The situation between 1975 and 1987 shows the growing 
importance of donor countries such as France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and Japan, while the United Kingdom's share has 
decreased substantially [Figure 11]. Throughout the 1975-1987 
period, the USA was still, by far, the primary donor. From 1978, the 
level of assistance from Japan is noteworthy - exceeding the 
Canadian defence budget for the same period! 
The situation is somewhat different for assistance received 
because, although the basic sample includes 74 countries, this was 
not sufficient to produce a balance between assistance provided and 
that received. 9 From 1965 to 1987, assistance received (in 1978 con-
stant US dollars) rose from $13-4 billion to $41 billion, that is, by a 
factor of three (Supplement 20A). For the entire 1965-1985 period, 
the cumulative total of assistance received was $679.3 billion. 
The regions to receive most assistance were, in descend-
ing order, Asia, Africa, South America, the Middle East, and Central 
9 This is basically the result of the sampling method used. Because statistics for coun-
tries at war or experiencing prolonged famine are not very reliable, only those coun-
tries with reliable statistics were used in sampling. Nevertheless, our statistics make 
it possible to account for 70% of ail assistance given between 1965 and 1985. 
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Figure 11. Five leading aid donor countries, 1965-1987 
(1978 constant us dollars). Source: Supplement 14A. 
America (Supplement 20). 10 Between 1985 and 1988, Asia received 
assistance of $40 billion, Africa $33.6 billion, South America 
$18.1 billion, and Central America $4.8 billion (in 1978 constant 
US dollars). 
We can also compare changes in assistance provided by 
the North as a function of military spending, and the relation-
ship between assistance received and military spending by the 
.South. The relationship between assistance provided and military 
spending from 1965 to 1988 reveals fundamental differences 
between countries. For Switzerland, notably, the ratio was 81.6%; 
assistance from Japan equalled 77.9% of that country's military 
spending. The se figures are fairly surprising, and we can only regret 
that the trend was not more widespread. For the OECD countries 
as a whole, the ratio of assistance to military spending was about 
10 Between 1<)80 and 1984, these regions received the following proportions of assis-
tance: South America, 24.5%; Asia, 23.3%; Africa, 21.6%; Central America, 12.3%; and 
the Middle East 10.1%. 
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Table 14. Assistance as percentage of military spending 
for donor countries, 1965-1988. 
Switzerland 81.7 Norway 29.4 
Japan 77.9 United Kingdom 27.7 
Belgium 42.9 Italy 27.3 
Canada 38.2 Germany (Federal Republic) 24.6 
Netherlands 37.3 Fini and 22.9 
Austria 35.5 New Zealand 21.9 
Denmark 33.4 Australia 2J.l 
France 32.6 USA 9.2 
Sweden 31.4 
. Source: Supplement 18A. 
Note: Assistance provided and military spending in current dollars. 
17.8%. Percentages for other countries during the same period are 
shown in Table i4. 
ln this context, we must obviously consider the interna-
tional responsibilities of the USA, which explains the low ratio 
between that country's assistance and military spending. It could 
also be said that the USA is not that far removed from the average 
of the OECD countries; however, it must also be considered that this 
average has dropped precisely because of the USA. One might almost 
be tempted to conclude that, once the superpowers are ready to 
spend as much on assistance as on their own security, the interna-
tional system might be influenced by the "peace by right" model or 
by the third, "transsystemic," model described earlier. However, 
this is not likely to occur in the near future as, for 1985-1988 alone, 
the ratio of assistance to military spending was only 8.25% for all 
the donor countries, and 2.3% for the USA {Supplement i9A). This 
significant decline calls to mind the late 196os, when the world was 
still enmeshed in the Cold War. 
Over the same period {1965-1988), military spending in the 
North increased 1.6 times, from $30I billion per year to $493 billion, 
while that of Third World countries increased 3.2 times, from 
$27.6 billion per year to $87.9 billion (from Appendix; 1978 constant 
US dollars). This would seem to indicate a gradual militarization 
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of the South. It is just as clear that the South's military growth 
far exceeded the assistance it was receiving. The situation is even 
more serious because, according to the World Bank's International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Development Committee, financial transfers 
(ail contributions) with the Third World had changed from a net 
inflow of $34 billion in 1981 to a net outflow of $22 billion in 1987, a 
swing of $56 billion dollars (Nouvelles Nord-Sud, Ottawa, Spring 
1989, No. 8). Foreign debt and militarization constituted the two 
most serious problems faced by the South during the 198os. 
However, generalizations cannot really be made in this 
regard as there are no directly observable links between assistance 
received by the regions and their military spending. Table 15 illus-
trates this very well. Possibly the most troubled region in the world, 
the Middle East, received relatively little assistance in relation toits 
military spending. 
Of the whole period in question, 1980-1984 seems to indi-
cate a slight improvement for South and Central America, where 
assistance increased in relation to military spending. It is, however, 
no great consolation, because ratios deteriorated from 1985 to 1988, 
except for Africa. These ratios reflect the generally drastic drop in 
assistance during the same period. In absolute terms, the regions 
that spent most on military equipment were, in descending order, 
Asia, the Middle East, South America, Africa, and Central America, 
at least between 1965 and 1988. With respect to assistance, the 
ranking was Asia, Africa, South America, the Middle East, and 
Central America. 
Statistically speaking, there are thus no significant direct 
relationships between assistance and military spending. We have 
examined the 25 countries that received most assistance (the five 
leading countries in each region - for Africa, Bénin, the Central 
African Republic, Liberia, Niger, and Sierra Leone; for Central 
America, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Panama; for South 
America, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Paraguay; for the 
Middle East, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and North Yemen; 
and, lastly, for Asia, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
and Thailand.). This proportion was expressed as the ratio of 
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Table 15. Assistance received in relation to military spending 
by region (billions of current us dollars). 
Central South Middle 
Africa America America Asia East Average 
1965-1988 
Assistance 149.2 67.5 138.1 172.8 102.3 
Military 
spending 98.0 24.4 123.4 730.0 649.3 
Ratio 1.52:1 2.76:1 1.21:1 0.24:1 0.16:1 1.16:1 
1980-1984 
Assistance 57.9 41.5 66.7 65.4 41.2 
Military 
spending 38.6 9.7 38.6 192.0 311.0 
Ratio 1.50:1 4.26:1 1.73:1 0.34:1 0.13:1 1.59:1 
1985,-1988 
Assistance 33.6 4.8 18.1 40.0 20.3 
Military 
spending 13.9 5.1 26.4 130.0 133.1 
Ratio 1.75:1 0.69:1 0.51:1 0.31:1 0.15:1 0.68:1 
Source: Supplement ig for military spending and Supplement 20 for assistance. 
assistance received to military spending (Supplement 18). With the 
exception of Bénin and Ecuador, none of these countries appears 
on the list of th ose most burdened by the percentage of arms imports 
to military spending, and only Egypt and Jordan appear on the list 
of countries wh,ere military trade plays an important role in total 
imports and on the list where the ratio of assistance received to mil-
itary spending is high. For these two countries, the situation is per-
fectly understandable. As for Bénin and Ecuador, two countries out 
of 25 is not very significant. 
Generally speaking, although there are no direct links 
between assistance and military spending, countries involved in 
regional conflicts must often rebuild their economies once the con-
flict is over; like natural disasters such as drought and flooding, this 
has a direct effect on the total demand for assistance. Equally, coun-
tries that can assume the costs of importing military equipment 
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divert considerable amounts of bard currency that could be rein-
vested elsewhere to more productive ends. 
These conclusions indicate that, in contrast to the state-
ments of the "realist" and "neorealist" schools of international rela-
tions, countries do not always base their assistance on geopolitical 
considerations. On the contrary, assistance seems to be given on a 
truly humanitarian basis, which would indicate that the models of 
"peace by might" and "peace by right" can coexist without too much 
difficulty. As pointed out earlier, nations should try in the future to 
defend policies aimed at containing the most destructive effects of 
the first model, that is, to limit the arms race and reduce military 
spending, and to increase international assistance and cooperation. 
Chapter 7 
Conflicts in the Third World and the North 
In general, the most interesting studies on international conflicts 
were conducted in the 196os and 197os. Those by Bloomfield and 
Leiss (1969), Barringer (1972), Kende (1972), Bouthoul and Carrère 
(1976), and Singer (1979) are the best known - of course, these 
authors continue in the tradition of Lewis Richardson, Pitirm 
Sorokin, and Quincy Wright. In 1976, Blechman and Kaplan pub-
lished a much-quoted work on the use of force as a political 
instrument, but to my knowledge, except for the very interesting 
work by Kaye et al. (1985) - go studies on conflicts are quoted in 
this report, but only a few were published after 1976 - and a few 
issues of the French review Polémologie, which often publishes very 
useful features on world violence, no major comprehensive works 
on war statistics have been published since. In our comments on 
war and the evolution of conflicts in the Third World, we will, 
therefore, be drawing mainly on the study by Kaye et al. (1985). 
The fact that war is destructive was something we already 
knew. The two World Wars alone caused mor'e deaths than the 
500 conflicts recorded between 1721 and 1985 - according to Kaye 
et al. (1985: 28), World War I resulted in 13 million deaths; World 
War II, 38 million; and the Taiping Rebellion ("The Great Peace") in 
1851, II million. What is less well-known, however, is that several 
conflicts since 1945 have each caused over one million deaths -
Cambodia, 3 million; Korea, 2 million; Vietnam, 1.8 million, 
Bangladesh, 1.5 million; Nigeria-Biafra, 1.1 million; and the 
Iraq-Iran war, probably between 0.5 and over 1 million - and that 
the total number of deaths resulting from conflicts since 1945 
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certainly exceeds IO million. For the period between 1961 and 1979 
alone, the number is 9.5 million (Legault 1983). If we were to take 
into account the particularly dramatic period of the Chinese civil 
war in 1949 and all other conflicts involving loss of life that have 
occurred since 1980, the figure could very well reach between IO and 
20 million. Losses incurred during World War II represented, over 
6 years, 1.5% of the population or 0.25% per year, while the birth 
rate at the time was 2% per year. 
We also know that, from 1951 to i985: 
There were 174 conflicts lasting an average of 5 years; 
There were more domestic wars (some with considerable 
external participation) than international wars; 
The regions most affected by the number of conflicts were, 
in descending order, Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the 
Middle East; and 
The "initiator" of the conflict emerged victorious 21.3% of 
the time, went down to defeat 34.5% of the time, and 
achieved a compromise in 19.5% of all cases. The outcome 
was uncertain or unknown in 24.7% of the cases because 
some of the conflicts under study had not yet ended 
(Kaye et al. 1985: 37, 43, 49, and 52).1 
These statistics are consistent with those in a study by Grant and 
Lindsey (1988) that show that, for the instigator, the probability of 
winning a war was 50% between 1700 and 1900; that the figure fell 
to 33% between 1900 and 1950; and that it was only 25% between 
i950 and 1985. 2 Not only does war cost lives, but it is not worthwhile. 
Furthermore, the same study shows that regional conflicts have 
1 With respect to the length ofwars (Kaye et al. 1g85: 36). the average was 64 months 
during the 195os. 74 months during the 196os. and 48 months during the 197os. 
The authors showed that the average length for the mid-198os was 20 months. 
The latter value will probably have to be reviewed at the end of the war in Afghanistan. 
the Iraq-Iran war. and the war for control of Cambodia. 
2 It is difficult here to compare statistics from various works on conflicts. as they 
do not always bear on the same periods or the same conflicts. For example, for 
the 1816-1974 period. Bueno de Mesquita (1981: 153) estimates that countries that 
instigated war when their power gave them the advantage of "expected utility"" won 
the war 83% of the time. As regards perception. for the 278 crises studied by 
Wilkenfeld et al. (ig88: 205) for the 1929-1979 period. the authors conclude that 38% of 
the 627 players involved felt they emerged victorious from the crisis. 
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tended to shift about 12 degrees toward the south; the same concept 
is described by Brzezinski as an "arc of crisis" and ex tends from the 
Near East to northeast Asia, taking in Iran, Afghanistan, India, and 
southeast Asia. 
The reason behind these morbid remarks is not to under-
line the extent and the seriousness of conflicts in the Third World, 
but to identify the main lessons that can be learned from East-West 
rivalries where conflicts and opposition are concerned, and to 
emphasize North-South interdependence with respect to conflicts. 
In the North, it is true that the nuclear deterrent has forced 
a certain amount of thought in East-West relations. However, to 
conclude blithely that the industrialized countries have not gone 
to war because they have been able to live under the "shade of 
the nuclear umbrella" is a bit hasty. It will never be possible to 
demonstrate the theory of nuclear deterrence, even though the 
maxim si vis pacem para bellum is still topical. 
This maxim, like nuclear deterrence, is based on the con-
tradictory hypothesis that countries must arm themselves in peace-
time to maintain that peace. For most people, however, peace 
involves disarmament, and war involves armament. The two most 
serious crises that have affected the "polarized" world were clearly 
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the general nuclear alert of 
the American forces during the 1973 October War. The successive 
crises in Berlin of 1958 and 1961 could also be mentioned here. 
Although the term "arms control" first appeared in official texts on 
disarmament during the 1955 Geneva Summit - and probably in 
the early l96os in university and public administration documents 
(Klein 1989) - since 1962, the superpowers have made every 
attempt to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to ensure that, 
should nuclear deterrence fail, the most devastating effects of 
a nuclear war would be limited. Such measures vary from the 
installation of a "hotline" in 1963 to the 1987 Agreement on the estab-
lishment of nuclear-risk reduction centres, and include the 
September 1971 Agreements on improving communications between 
the superpowers in times of crisis, measures intended to reduce 
the risk of nuclear war, the Agreement of May 1972 on preventing 
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incidents on the high seas, and the June 1973 Agreement on pre-
venting nuclear war. 
There is no doubt here that the "brink-of-the-abyss" policy 
is no longer a useful means of managing conflicts, and that the 
superpowers now realize more than ever that certain methods 
designed to guarantee their security could one day have the oppo-
site effect. Many things changed between Hiroshima and Chernobyl, 
one of the most important being Gorbachev's "declaration ofpeace" 
toward the West. "Peaceful coexistence" is no longer subject to the 
principles of the class struggle when the ecology of the planet is at 
stake, or when the concept of the inevitability ofwar must be fought 
by ail possible means. 
With respect to strategy, the two blocs have agreed to limit 
or reduce their most offensive air and land capabilities as part of 
the CFE talks - negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe in Vienna (the former acronym, CAFE, was replaced as some 
participants felt that the name "the CAFE of Vienna" was not very 
serious!) - and the West is now undertaking major diplomatie 
efforts to make sure these agreements will also be respected by 
the new republics in the framework of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Other changes were apparent even before 
the breakup of the Soviet empire. For example, "nonprovocative" 
defence was also the result of the troubling conclusions the world 
has drawn from the accident at Chernobyl. Even in a war begun in. 
a purely traditional manner, the European industrial infrastruc-
ture is now too vulnerable, given the risks of nuclear, chemical, 
and industrial pollution, to risk any kind of conventional conflict. 
The Soviets admitted as much in their first report on the conse-
quences of the Chernobyl accident, submitted to the IAEA, and have 
repeated it since. In nuclear matters, a ST ART agreement was signed 
in July 1991 and other substantial unilateral reductions were 
announced in January 1992; these were followed by the startling 
agreement in June 1992 under which Russia and the USA agreed to 
eut their nuclear arsenals to 3 ooo and 3 500 warheads respectively 
by the year 2003. The major problem for the West will be to make 
sure that every republic now in the CIS will respect the treaties 
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signed by the former USSR, such as the NPT (nonproliferation treaty), 
and to institutionalize bureaucratie control on the transfer of sen-
sitive technology to other countries. 
As part of the follow-up to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) - once known as the CCSBMDE 
(Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe) - unprecedented confidence and secu-
rity-building measures have been taken to make military opera-
tions and activities in Europe more open and less ambiguous. The 
disappearance of the former Soviet military "glacis" in Central 
Europe has removed the threat of a swift military action in that 
area, and most of the future measures will be designed to increase 
greater military transparency in those areas. The INF agreements 
(December 1987, ratified by the USSR in the summer of1988) as well 
as the START agreements are very demanding with respect to veri-
fication and on-site inspections. We are, thus, far removed from the 
situation of the 195os and 196os, when the USA was doing its utmost 
to break through the Soviet borders by means ofspy planes. Today, 
we are witnessing a graduai transformation of the old antagonisms 
into relationships based on positive action, with suspicion giving 
way to trust, and trust to cooperation. 
These transformations are just as evident in the West. 
Undoubtedly, the first democratization of the strategic debate dates 
back to the time of us Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 
who felt that military matters were too important to be left solely to 
the discretion of the military. Since that time, the statements of 
various churches and bishops, of certain labour movements, and 
the increasingly critical attitude of a Congress that is now unwill-
ing to grant everything demanded of it in the name of security or 
the vital need to reestablish us leadership have brought about a 
democratization of the debate that no one would have predicted 
even 10 years earlier. Better than anyone, strategists realize that 
nuclear deterrence is "sick," that it is becoming increasingly less 
credible at a time when nuclear parity is perfectly established. 
Wisdom rather than technology must be used to ensure security; 
in other words, security must be maintained at the lowest cost 
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possible and through positive action, such as arms control, instead 
of through the endless spiral represented by the search for strate-
gic superiority. 
In general, there are four different types of conflicts that 
have had a more or less direct effect on North-South relations. First, 
there were the bitter bilateral conflicts between the superpowers 
(Korea, Cuba, and Berlin), which some have called "systemic." Not 
only have these brought the planet to the brink of the abyss several 
times, but they have also exacerbated other conflicts in the Third 
World and raised the stakes in the "game" between the super-
powers to win the allegiance of other countries. The rivalry among 
the superpowers thus resulted in military alliances without neces-
sarily creating "communities of security," to use an expression 
made famous by American political pundit Karl Deutsch. In the 
main, these events produced communities of insecurity, which 
doubtless stirred up regional conflicts instead of reducing them. 
A second type of conflict resulted from the division of 
several countries after World War II. The case ofGermany bas now 
been settled, although economic dissatisfaction is widespread in the 
former German Democratic Republic. On the other band, the reuni-
fication of Vietnam was a disaster for southeast Asia from both an 
economic and human point of view, and it is anyone's guess what 
would happen in the event of reunification of North and South 
Korea, two countries where militarism is strongly entrenched. It is, 
however, certain that reunification of the two Koreas could revive 
old antagonisms between Korea and Japan and, consequently, 
increase the possibility of regional conflict. 
A third type of conflict involves the severe polarization of 
relations between the main rivais in a given region. Examples here 
abound, the best known being Israel and its Arab neighbours, Iran 
and Iraq, India and Pakistan, and Brazil and Argentina. Despite the 
recent cairn in several of these regions, the spectre of nuclear pro-
liferation, delivery systems capable of taking nuclear warheads to 
the enemy, and the possible proliferation of the "poor man's nuclear 
bomb" - chemical and bacteriological weapons - could ail have 
incalculable consequences on North-South relations. 
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ln this regard, although there are writers who insist that 
"more may be better" (what French general Pierre Gallois had 
already anticipated when he spoke of the "equalizing atom"), most 
observers are justifiably concerned about the threat of nuclear 
proliferation. Despite the three review conferences on the non-
proliferation treaty, the last ofwhich was a failure, uncertainty and 
doubt remain as to the ability of the international community to 
eliminate nuclear proliferation. Nonetheless, we may congratulate 
ourselves that several countries with nuclear arms are making 
every possible attempt to extend "full-scope safeguards" to as many 
countries as possible, and on the possibility that certain recalcitrant 
nations, such as Taiwan, may be persuaded to sign the nonprolif-
eration treaty. ln this regard, however, it would appear difficult to 
avoid nuclear proliferation in the long term unless those countries 
with nuclear arms do more to reduce their own arsenal. Only 
increased efforts will make it possible to envisage arms-control 
theories being applied in the southern hemisphere. 
As for possible proliferation, no argument or hypothesis 
can be excluded. One of two things is likely, however: either the 
superpowers would distance themselves from their respective 
allies if the unavoidable occurred (and in these conditions, certain 
allies would be in danger ofbeing abandoned), or the superpowers 
would do everything they could to impose a settlement on the con-
flict, with or without the regional participants agreeing - as 
occurred in the Gulf. One thing is certain: ifjust one nuclear weapon 
were employed, the danger of radioactive contamination would be 
greater if the explosion took place in the northern hemisphere 
rather than in the southern, given that the prevailing winds corne 
from the east. In either case, however, everyone would be exposed 
to some extent in the long term. In the end, the double crisis of 
"decoupling" and "settlement imposition" could only result in the 
"implosion" of the region in question and the need to decontami-
nate it afterwards. Such a task could well surpass all available 
means of coping with nuclear accidents. 
Sorne authors also emphasize the dangers of a more or less 
automatic escalation between the superpowers in the event of a 
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nuclear conflict between two regional countries. We do not feel 
this is a very realistic hypothesis, given the climate of heightened 
cooperation that the superpowers seem to be establishing among 
themselves. Although this theory obviously cannot be rejected out 
of hand, the first two seem more convincing, even in the event of 
considerable tension between the superpowers. The latter are 
becoming increasingly aware of the threat of nuclear arms in a 
conflict, and of the futility of using them to achieve a negotiated 
political solution. 
A fourth type of conflict involves the "pariah" countries, 
or those that have been more or less ostracized because their 
domestic policies in relation to universally recognized human-
rights standards, are deemed intolerable. South Africa is the best 
example here, but other countries could also be added to this 
disreputable list, if the rights of ethnie majorities in certain areas 
continue to be violated in the name of the survival of existing 
regimes and policies. 
In general, the result of these four types of conflict is to 
introduce serious distortions within the system, and certain coop-
erative transsystemic, intersystemic, and intrasystemic relations 
cannot then be normalized. The first and second types cause 
a freeze in the parameters of the status quo, the third indi-
cates an equally obvious problem at the regional level, and the 
fourth makes regional opposition forces more radical, which again 
merely nullifies any attempt at accommodation or rapprochement 
that the more moderate .elements would like to make. In ail cases, 
too, the multiplication of local and regional conflicts throughout 
the world has helped to accelerate the militarization process, at 
the expense of economic growth and the development of structural 
relations capable of encouraging a better integration of nations 
within the "transsystemic" model analyzed above. 
For almost two decades, however, a new "low-intensity" 
but high "media density" form of conflict has appeared. Inter-
national terrorism now holds a particular place in the analysis of 
conflicts. We, therefore, feel it would be useful to devote part ofthis 
book to analyzing this problem. 
Chapter 8 
The Terrorist Dimension 
There are over 5 ooo works on international terrorism (Lakos 1986) 
and, in Canada, the Secretariat of the Solicitor General's Office has 
recently published a major bibliography on this subject (Canada, 
Solicitor General 1990). We do not intend to deal extensively with 
the problem here, but rather to identify new dimensions of the ter-
rorist threat as regards North-South security. 
Growth of terrorism 
Terrorism, which is an enemy of freedom for some and a symbol 
of political liberation for others, is hard to define because it has 
so many faces. Everyone agrees that it consists of premeditated, 
deliberate violence directed against symbolic targets, and that its 
objectives are political in nature - this de finition resembles that of 
Manor (1989). According to Marie-France Toinet (1989: 112), expert 
Walter Laqueur (1987: 72-73) has absolutely no· chance of being 
listened to when he writes: 
Terrorism ... has been waged by national and religious groups, 
by the left and by the right, by nationalist as well as internation-
alist movements, and it has been state-sponsored .... Terrorist 
movements have frequently consisted of members of the educated 
middle classes, but there has also been agrarian terror, terror by 
the uprooted and the rejected, and trade union and working-class 
terror .... Terror has been directed against autocratie regimes as 
well as democracies .... Movements of national liberation and 
social revolution (or reaction) have turned to terrorism after 
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political action hasfailed. But elsewhere, and at other times, ter-
rorism ... has been chosen by militant groups even before options 
were tried. 
This complex view of the matter is obviously far from the 
oversimplification that "the most powerful totalitarian state of 
our time also provides most of the support and financing for 
international terrorism" (translation; Toinet (1989) quoting 
Jeane Kirkpatrick). At one time, this was probably fairly true, but 
today it is more or less false. Furthermore, counterterrorist 
operations raise problems of their own, and this raises the issue 
of the end result of violence. Although counterterrorism does claim 
its own victims, this at least is not the result of premeditation, 
in contrast to violence by "indiscriminate victimization" (a term 
borrowed from Manor). 
Having established these differences, there is still no 
consensus from country to country on how to define terrorist 
operations. As Leszek Kolakowski (1986: 48 quoted in Manor 1989: 
n3) bas already stated, "Our uncertainty as to [knowing] when to 
use the term terrorist represents the other side of our confusion 
about the concept of legitimacy" (translation). Should we, for 
example, include the actions of deranged individuals whose motives 
are psychopathological in nature? Or operations that are more 
criminal than political, even if the means employed are often 
the same, such as hostage-takings, explosives, and bombings? 
We can see how distinctions may vary from one country to 
another, which to a large extent explains the variations in statis-
tics on terrorist violence. 
Furthermore, the definitions used by the us Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the us Department of State (USDS) 
have changed with time; certain categories of events have been 
dropped, and others added (in this regard, see the basic study by 
Anthony Kellet (1988)). Comparisons by period are thus subject to 
several random variables, but the figures nonetheless speak for 
themselves. In 20 years, terrorism struck over 13 100 times and 
claimed 26 172 victims: 8 053 dead and 18 119 wounded. This is both 
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a considerable number and yet not very many. It is not many in 
relation to the number of deaths caused every year by conflicts 
and rivalries, but it is a significant number of ordinary citizens and 
travelers. 
The values in Table 16 show that, except for the years 
1980-1984, the number of deaths has increased steadily for the 
5-year periods from the 197os, with 1985-1989 being the most 
serious of ail. There has also been a constant increase in the 
number ofinjured, and this has been particularly marked over the 
past decade. However, terrorism showed a significant decrease 
during 1989 and it is probable that 1990 will continue this trend. 
In spite of this, overall, the 1985-1989 period will have taken 
more lives than any other period in the entire history of modern 
terrorism. 
The evolution of terrorism can also be considered in terms 
of the relationship between the number of dead and injured to the 
number of terrorist incidents during the same period [Table 17]. 
However one defines terrorism, statistics indicate that this 
modern-day plague is on the rise, with the average number ofvic-
tims being 2.6 individuals per attack during the period 1985-1989. 
Although we are witnessing a fierce struggle between pro- and 
antiterrorist forces, it would be premature to predict the outcome 
of that struggle. The democracies are becoming increasingly 
cooperative in their fight against terrorism; at the same time, how-
ever, the means used by terrorist organizations are also becoming 
more sophisticated and difficult to detect, especially with the use 
of plastic explosives. In some cases, the expiosives can only be 
obtained with the help of certain countries. If, as some people hope, 
East-West cooperation in the antiterrorist struggle increases over 
the coming years, the probability of successful aircraft hijackings 
will decrease between 1990 and 1995. Although this phenomenon 
will not alleviate some seemingly interminable regional conflicts, 
such as those in Northern Ireland and Palestine, terrorist organi-
zations in general may find they are receiving little support from 
countries they were able to count on in the past. 
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Table 16. Number of terrorist incidents, 
dead, and injured, 1968-1989. 
No. of No. of No. of Total 
incidents de ad injured victims 
1968 142 35 208 243 
1969 214 64 202 266 
Subtotal 356 99 410 509 
(2. 7)a (1.2) (2.3) 
1970 391 131 212 343 
1971 324 36 227 263 
1972 648 157 413 570 
1973 564 127 551 678 
1974 528 344 1100 1 444 
Subtotal 2 455 795 2 503 3 298 
(18.7) (9.9) (13.8) 
1975 475 276 748 1 024 
1976 599 415 920 1 335 
1977 562 261 461 722 
1978 850 442 690 1 132 
1979 657 738 664 1 402 
Subtotal 3 163 2132 3 483 5 615 
(24.1) (26.5) (19.2) 
1980 760 642 1 078 1 720 
1981 709 173 824 997 
1982 794 140 814 954 
1983 500 650b 1 273 1 923 
1984 597 312 1 000 1 312 
Subtotal 3 360 1 917 4 989 6 906 
(25.6) (23.8) (27 .5) 
1985 782 825c 1 217 2 042 
1986 785d 604 1 717 2 321 
1987 832 633 2 272 2 905 
1988 856 658e 1 131 1 789 
1989 528 390 397 787 
Subtotal 3 783 3 110 6 734 9 844 
(28.9) (38.6) (37.2) 
Total 13 117 8 053 18119 26 172 
Source: Based on data from Kellett (1988: appendix F) and USDS (1989: 4-Sl 
a Values in parentheses are percentages of column total. 
b lncludes the 296 Marines killed in Beirut. 
c lncludes the Air lndia explosion. 
d Calculation based on graph in USDS (1989: 2). 
e lncludes explosion on Pan Am flight 103 (21 December 1988). 
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Table 17. Ratio of dead and injured to number of terrorist attacks. 
Number per attack 
De ad lnjured Victims 
1970-74 0.32 1.02 1.34 
1975-79 0.67 1.10 1.77 
1980-84 0.57 1.48 2.05 
1985-89 0.82 1.78 2.60 
Total (1968-89) 0.61 1.38 1.99 
Source: Table t6. 
Statistics on aircraft hijackings, because they are so 
dramatic, are probably more reliable than general statistics on 
terrorist attempts. Here, too, however, definitions vary from 
country to country. Furthermore, the problems involved in decid-
ing what constitutes an isolated case (for example, a psychopath 
demanding a parachute to escape or a ransom for a nonpolitical 
cause) and what constitutes a true terrorist action are just as real 
as those involved in determining what constitutes a terrorist act 
in general. 
We have chosen here to compare three different sources 
of statistics on aircraft hijackings [Table 18]. These are from 
Captain Claude Bergeron, the IFP (Institut français de polémologie), 
and the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). Variations are 
great-est between source l and sources 2 and 3, doubtless because 
Bergeron draws heavily on secondary sources that the FAA most 
probably does not use. Bergeron's statistics include possible hijack-
ing attempts, threats to take over aircraft, and sabotage attempts 
and threats. The three sources thus cannot be compared in full. 
However, if we compare 1970-1985 (where data are available from 
both sources), the totals are remarkably similar for the last two 
sources (IFP, 567; FAA, 587). 
Despite the differences among sources, the results are 
more or less comparable when we examine the 1970-1985 period in 
5-year subdivisions [Table 19]. As can be seen from these values, the 
number of aircraft hijackings was at an all-time high between 1970 
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Table 18. Numbers of aircraft hijackings 
according to three sources. 
Source 3 
Source 1 Source 2 World USA 
1968 37 36 22 
1969 95 90 40 
1970 115 91 83 27 
1971 71 62 58 27 
1972 116 71 62 31 
1973 51 28 22 2 
1974 39 24 26 7 
1975 35 25 25 12 
1976 48 18 18 4 
1977 48 32 32 6 
1978 44 31 31 13 
1979 53 27 27 13 
1980 64 41 41 22 
1981 72 32 32 8 
1982 55 17 32 10 
1983 50 30 34 19 
1984 43 25 28 7 
1985 65 13 36 6 
1986 25 5 
1987 4 
1988 7 
Total 1126 709 587 276 
Source 1: Bergeron (!989). 
Source 2: IFP (!988). The IFP compares three main sources: statistics produced by the 
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security), statistics 
provided by Michel Clërel, head of the emergency medical department at Paris 
airport, and statistics from the German Cockpit Association in Frankfurt. Except for 
the years 1982 and 1985, IFP statistics seem fairly consistent with those of the FAA 
(the differences would appear to stem from the fact that domestic flights are not 
dealt with in the same manner by the various sources). 
Source 3: Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security, 
us Department of Transport, Washington, DC. USA. 
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Table 19. Numbers of aircraft hijackings per 5-year period 
according to three sources. 
Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 
1970-74 392 (40.5}a 276 (48. 7) 251 (42.8) 
1975-79 228 (23.5) 133 (23.4) 133 (22.7) 
1980-84 284 (29.3) 145 (25.6) 167 (28.4) 
1985 65 (6. 7) 13 (2.3) 36 (6.1) 
Sources: 1 - Bergeron (1989); 2 - IFP (1988); 3 - lJS Federal Aviation Administration. 
a Values in parentheses are percentages for period 1970-1985. 
and 1974; it then stabilized to some extent for 1975-1979 and 
1980-1984. There are no real differences between these last two 
periods. It is very probable that the 1985-1989 period will show a 
substantial decline in the number of hijackings, as the downward 
trend since 1975 has been attributable to increased security mea-
sures in airports since 1973. 
The values reveal something entirely different, however, 
when it cornes to comparing the number of deaths resulting from 
hijackings, especially those attributable to explosions en route 
[Table 20]. These values might tempt one to conclude that the 
1970-1974 period was the worst, as the average number of deaths 
in relation to hijackings was 1.72, as compared to 1.31 and 0.79 
for the 1975-1979 and 1980-1984 periods. However, we know that 
the 1985-1989 period will reverse this trend, because, despite the 
downward trend in the number of hijackings, the number of 
deaths for this period rose. Although we do not have ail the 
statistics from 1985 to 1989, in addition to the Air India and 
Egyptair flights mentioned for 1985, we know the tragic outcome of 
Pan Am flight 103 (270 dead, 189 of whom were US citizens) 
in December 1988, and of UTA 772 from Ndjamena to Paris, which 
exploded above the Ténéré desert in Niger (171 dead). These values 
could increase the ratio of number of deaths per hijacking to 
about 25, which, in relation to the frequency of terrorist actions, 
would be hitherto unequalled. 
There is thus a highly ironie element in ail this. Security 
measures have clearly contributed greatly to limiting the choice of 
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Table 20. Number of deaths in relation to frequency of hijackings. 
No. of No. of Deaths per 
incidents deaths incident 
1970 91 84 0.92 
1971 62 25 0.40 
1972 71 114 1.61 
1973 28 92 3.29 
1974 24 161 6.71 
Subtotal 276 476 1.72 
1975 25 1 0.04 
1976 18 168 9.33 
1977 32 0 
1978 31 5 0.16 
1979 27 0 
Subtotal 133 174 1.31 
1980 41 0 
1981 32 2 0.06 
1982 17 1 0.06 
1983 30 112 3.73 
1984 25 0 
Subtotal 145 115 0.79 
1985 13 390• 30.00 
Source: lFP (1988). 
a lncludes Air lndia llight (Montreal-London). 23 June 1985, 329 dead) and Egyptair 
flight (Athens-Cairo. 23 November 1985. 60 dead). 
easy targets for terrorist organizations, which are increasingly less 
interested in destroying symbolic targets such as buildings and 
property and more determined to revenge themselves indiscrimi-
nately on innocent people su ch as aircraft passengers. However, 
attacks using plastic explosive may well have been planned 10 years 
ago, with several more years required before the explosive could 
be obtained, and more time still needed to plan how it would be 
used, as major airports become increasingly secure. 1 This phe-
1 One could always reply that this statement can be refuted by what happened to 
Pan Am llight 103. which originated in Frankfurt and London. lt is just as probable 
that fear of failure forced certain organizations to rely on different methods in many 
other cases. 
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Table 21. Ratio of deaths caused by aircraft explosions 
to total number of deaths caused by terrorist attacks. 
Total number of 
deaths attributable to -
Aircraft as 
Aircraft percentage of 
Terrorism bombings terrorism 
1970-74 795 476 59.9 
1975-79 2 132 174 8.2 
1980-84 1 917 115 6.0 
1985-88 2 720 660 24.3 
1985-89. 3 400 841 24.7 
Sources: Table 16 (terrorism) and Table 20 (aircraft bombings). 
a The 1985-1989 value was estimated on the basis of the simple arimetic mean for 1985, 
1986, 1987, and 1988. The last incident taken into account was, therefore, the UTA flight, 
which claimed 171 victims (!9 September 1989). 
nomenon would explain the fresh outbreak of aircraft bombings 
that is taking place more than 10 years after the first security mea-
sures were implemented in airports. 
Until recently, we could congratulate ourselves on the 
grndual decline in the number of deaths caused by aircraft explo-
sions, which, for some time, had accounted for an extremely small 
portion of the total number of victims of terrorism. The episodes 
that took place from 1985 to 1989, however, obviously force us to 
reconsider the situation. Aircraft hijackings played a major role 
in the terrorist strategies of the 1970-1974 period [Table 21]. Data 
from 1975 to 1985 confirm the effectiveness of security measures 
in airports,2 while figures for 1985-1989 reveal a significant rene-
wal in "indiscriminate victimization," attributable largely to an 
increase in sophisticated technical methods at 'the disposai of 
terrorist organizations. 
One last statistic: although more lethal, aircraft hijackings 
are accounting for an increasingly smaller percentage of all terrorist 
2 Like Bergeron (!989: 922), we feel that these security measures have been much 
more effective at limiting the number of hijackings than antiterrorist-force operations. 
Significant results are also expected from the convention recently signed in Montreal 
(March 1991) by 40 countries, including Iraq and Czechoslovakia, on methods to "mark" 
various chemical products making up plastic explosives. This convention is called 
"Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection" 
(see Washington Post of 2 March 1991). 
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attempts [Table 18]. The values for 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 
and 1985-1988 are: 11.2%, 4.2%, 4.3% and 0.9% (in accordance with IFP 
figures, 29 incidents were used for the 1985-1988 period). 
Terrorist attacks in Canada 
and the cost of security measures 
Canada has not been spared violence. Judy M. Torrance (1986: 41) 
states that there were: 
Twenty-two Orange-Green riots in Toronto between 1867 and 
1892 ... 300 violent strikes between 1900 and 1974 ... several 
hundred cases of Doukhobor violence ... 170-odd events attributed 
to the FLQ [Front de Libération du Québec] ... and 246 acts of col-
lective violence in Ontario and Quebec between 1963 and 1973···· 
According to figures from the Department of the Solicitor 
General published in the report by the Honourable William M. Kelly 
(1989), about 300 terrorist incidents occurred in Canada between 
1960and1989. In a report from the Department of National Defence, 
Anthony Kellett (1988: 94)3 lists about 400 incidents, 48 of which 
were attributable to international terrorism, for the 1960-1985 
period alone. These high numbers stem from the fact that all 
acts of violence in Canada fall under the Criminal Code, making 
it difficult to distinguish between violence per se and political 
terrorism. 
The various works and publications all agree that domes-
tic terrorism is on the decline, which automatically increases the 
relative importance of international terrorism in Canada, as this 
was relatively stable during the period under consideration. Figures 
from the Kelly and Kellett reports clearly emphasize this. The Kellett 
report shows that, between 1965 and 1969, the ratio of domestic 
3 Anthony Kellett is now seconded to the Office of the Solicitor General, where he has 
taken over the duties of Chiefof Research at the National Security Coordination Centre. 
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to international terrorism was 11.5:1. By and large, the two reports 
show that domestic violence is on the wane, with the exception 
of the 1980-1984 period, which seems to have been characterized 
by a new wave of terrorist activity. If we rely on the Kelly report 
alone, however, it is obvious that the most recent period under 
consideration (1985-1989) is characterized by a balance between 
domestic and international terrorism. 4 In other words, it is 
external events that are making Canada increasingly vulnerable 
to acts of political violence. When presenting statistics on inter-
national terrorism, 5 we now distinguish foreign from domestic 
incidents. Of the 51 cases of international terrorism identified by 
the Department of the Solicitor General for the 1968-1989 period, 
35 occurred in Canada and 16 took place abroad. Almost half of 
these incidents were the result of action by immigrant groups,6 the 
best known being the anti-Castro movements in the l96os, and, 
more recently, extremist Armenian and Sikh movements. 
Most terrorist attacks in Canada are bombings -
63% according to Kelly (1989: 40) or over 50% according to Kellett 
(1988: appendix c-3) - with the main targets being the diplomatie 
community (50%), the business world (10%), and the government 
(10%) (Kellett 1988: appendix c-3; Kelly 1989: 41). We do not have 
any chronological data on the number of victims claimed by 
international terrorism on Canadian soil; however, according to 
4 This characteristic is even more pronounced if we rely solely on the Kelly report. 
However. it does not seem to correspond greatly to the situation in European 
countries. In France, for example. for the 1981-1986 period. 3 524 attacks by 
explosive (3 328 of which were made by extremist movements) were related to 
domestic terrorism, as compared with 84 for international terrorism. These figures 
were supplied by the Minister of the Interior in response to a question by 
Michel Hannoun (see Journal Officiel. questions écrites for Montlay 26 October 1987 
(pp. 5 963-5 964)). 
s International terrorism is defined as being motivated by "issues or grievances 
springing from past or current actions or situations in another country and whose 
ultimate focus is ... that other country's people and government" (Kelly 1989: 9). In this 
category, domestic incidents are distinguished from international incidents. 
For example, a Canadian journalist or citizen kidnapped abroad would fall into 
the latter category. 
6 Responsible for 47% of the incidents; nationalists or autonomists were respon-
sible for 18% (Kelly, 1989: 42). Kellett"s figures are somewhat different: he daims 
that 73% of terrorist acts for the period between 1968 and 1987 were due to immigrant 
movements within Canada. We should also mention that only 46 incidents are included 
here as being true terrorist attacks. as opposed to the 51 identified in the Kelly report 
(see Kellett 1988: appendix C-1). 







Table 22. Number of terrorist incidents in Canada 
between 1965 and 1985 
Domestic terrorism International terrorism 
Kelly Kellett Kelly Kellett 
(1989) (1988) (1989) (1988) 
103 138 >7a 12 
60 95 15 9 
18 22 2 11 
31 39 14 12 
13 NA 13 NA 
225 294 51 44 
a Kelly (1989) supplies figures on international terrorism for i968 and 1969 only. 
NA= not available. 
international expert Edward F. Mickolus (quoted in Kellett 1988: 
106), there were 23 victims ofterrorism in Canada between 1968 and 
1977, putting this country 14th in the world. It is likely that Canada 
bas since dropped somewhat on this scale of violence, given the 
more dramatic increase in terrorism in other countries. 
However, there is one major exception to this trend: the 
explosion of the Air India flight on 23June1985 that killed329 people, 
279 of whom were Canadian. This incident alone probably multi-
plied by a very large factor the average number of deaths due to 
terrorist incidents in Canada during the 198os - Kellett (1988: 
appendices A and B) identifies only 31 deaths as being indisputably 
the result ofterrorist attacks during the 1968-1987 period. Kelly, in 
bis report, insists quite rightly on the dangers of the resurgence of 
international terrorism in Canada, and also on those of "narco-
terrorism," which have not yet made their presence felt to a signifi-
cant degree in this country (Kelly 1989: 7). 
The costs ofterrorism for the West are enormous. In addi-
tion to the fact that European countries have been deprived of 
major sums of bard currency because of a drop in the usual number 
of tourists - for i985 alone, the US State Department estimated 
that losses due to the drop in tourist revenues in Europe amounted 
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to $1 billion (quoted in Kellett 1988: 14)-one must consider improve-
ments in international cooperation in the antiterrorist struggle, 
the cost of international conferences on these important issues, 7 
the compensation that some countries pay to victims of terrorism, 
or the damage to public property,8 not to mention the phenomenal 
increase in the cost of reinforcing security measures at borders, 
on railways, and in airports and foreign embassies. Ali these factors 
make it almost impossible to arrive at total cost on an international, 
or even national, scale. 
According to Anthony Kellett (1988: 151): 
It was estimated that the first year (1986-87) of the new counter-
terrorist programme cost $48.8 million, excluding about $7 million 
spent on the cs1s [Canadian Security Intelligence Service] counter-
terrorism programme ... and the RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police] budget was increased in 1987-88 to allow it to hire 500 new 
people to replace personnel diverted to the fight against terrorism. 
According to the figures at our disposai, reinforced secu-
rity measures at international and secondary airports designed to 
monitor the perimeter and access to security areas could represent 
annual investments of about $70 million over a period of 9 years, 
or $630 million between 1988 and 1996. This figure does not include 
expected capital expenditures of $25 million per year for the same 
period. At the very least, airport security will require $100 million 
per year. 
7 For Europe, these are, in particular, the Club of Bern (which includes Switzerland 
and the countries of the European Economie Community (EEC). except Ireland 
and Greece since 1971); TREVI (which was established in 1976 and includes the EEC 
countries and Morocco) (TREVI is the Terrorisme, Radicalisme et Violence Inter-
national police network); and the Club of Five or Club of Vienna, whose meetings 
on terrorism and the means to combat it have taken place regularly since 1979 at 
two Jevels (ministers and senior civil servants). Obviously, to these forms of coopera-
tion we may add thàt taking place at the Jevel of judicial inquiry - in particular, 
as part of Interpol. 
B Between 1969 and 1987. the United Kingdom apparently paid over s140 million 
in compensation for deaths and injuries, and $800 million for property damage 
caused by Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists (quoted in Kellett (1988)). ln France, 
section 9 of the Act of 9 September i988 on the battle against terrorism and attacks 
against the security of the state provides, by means of an indemnity fund, for full 
compensation for bodily harm res ulting from terrorist acts. France budgeted 
210 million francs for the fund for 1987. 25 million of which have apparently already 
been paid out. For attacks occurring before 1 January 1985, a credit of 40 million 
francs was allocated to the Department of the Interior. (This information was obtained 
during a visit by the author to the Department of the Jnterior in Paris in January 1989.) 
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This sum is considerable when compared with what it 
cost Canada to participate in about 15 UN peace-keeping operations 
from 1949to1980, about $166 million (Sigler 1989A: 27). Furthermore, 
since 1988, Canada has been part of several observer missions -
in Iran-Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan in i988 and Namibia 
and Central America in 1989 - in addition to its usual roles in the 
Middle East and Cyprus. The costs of this cooperation in peace 
missions will probably amount to $25 million, half of which is 
probably recoverable from the UN. These figures are obviously 
misleading, as they do not include training costs for the peace-
keeping contingents; these costs are, of course, absorbed by the 
general budget of the Department of National Defence. However, 
even general figures provide a good indication of the scale of costs 
represented by the antiterrorist struggle. ln other words, there 
has been a gradual shift of the East-West threat toward forms of 
conflict that, until now, have received very little attention from 
decision makers. It is also conceivable that terrorist incidents 
will increase in countries with very strict forms of state control, su ch 
as the former USSR, without western countries necessarily suffer-
ing any repercussions. 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
Lenin died for the second time on 7 February 1990, the day that the 
plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) decided that the Party's "leading role" in 
government should be abolished. The former USSR is now suffering 
from an advanced form of "constitutional cannibalism" while, 
within the empire, an unbelievable process ofnationalism has corne 
to the fore. 
It is no longer certain whether yesterday's victorious 
powers are now friends or merely accomplices in a huge industrial 
reorganization that could jeopardize the accomplishments of long 
North-South discussions. Whatever the case, both sides are coop-
erating out of a fear of generalized instability that could extend from 
the former USSR to other regions of the world. At the same time, 
there is a threat on the horizon of a return to Muslim fundamen-
talism: pressures are being felt increasingly strongly in the Soviet 
Muslim republics, in Kashmir, and in the Arab world, including 
Algeria and Morocco. The Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic 
Salvation Front: whose slogan is: "The West is degenerate. No East, 
No West, Islam is the best") seems to be gaining ground, in Algeria 
especially. 
The word "democracy" does not exist in Islamic dictionar-
ies, the Koran, the Sunna, or the sharia. Democracy was invented 
by the people, or rather by philosophers of the people, as a means 
of defence against the abuses of kings who held their power by 
divine right. Islam, which is both a religion and a sacred, civil 
community, has not been able to offer a valid alternative to the 
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problems faced by the West. However, it is true that, with the Peace 
of Westfalia in 1648, the West secularized its politics, and lay think-
ing has perhaps imposed solutions that too often ignore concerns 
about mankind and its environment. At this point, it is possible to 
believe that the religious factor, which has caused antagonism, will 
eventually be again included among other aspects of contemporary 
political life, and this without the need for countries to resort to war 
to solve their differences. In this sense, the GulfWar might have sig-
nified for the Middle East what the ThirtyYears War did for Europe. 
Nonetheless, at the dawn of what may be a new intellec-
tual renaissance, it is still true that current debates are character-
ized by many questions concerning values and the ultimate place of 
mankind in the universe. What conclusions about security can we 
legitimately draw from this study? 
Generally speaking, even if East-West relations experi-
enced some highs and lows in the throes of the Cold War, they were 
still gradually moving toward a reasonably stable balance. Political 
cooperation became progressively more important than the need to 
stabilize a military situation that, throughout the years, grew more 
and more untenable. We are not here going to restart the debate 
between those who believe that this situation was the result of the 
West having won the Cold War, and those who hold the contrary 
view, that the great political metamorphosis was due to changes in 
attitudes, particularly of the Soviet political leaders, that led to the 
disappearance ofideological differences between the two blocs and, 
consequently, promoted political cooperation. 
It will be enough to present some strong points, all dealing 
with the links between policy and security. The East-West war will 
never again be a rational means of extending national foreign 
policy. It will prove too costly, there will be no winner, and scien-
tific studies indicate that the very survival of the planet may even-
tually be at risk. 
During the same period, western nations also realized 
that it was necessary to move from dis trust to a situation of relative 
stability through arms-control negotiations and the strengthening 
of international confidence. This process led to an increase in 
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institutional seminars on arms control that created their own secu-
rity needs and functions. This slow transformation also allowed the 
countries to follow more closely the "peace by right" model, here 
taken in the sense of a more extensive regulation of arms control 
through institutional negotiations, as opposed to the old "peace by 
might" model. 
However, the political situation after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall has evolved so rapidly that arms-control negotiations are drag-
ging on, because they are still a factor in the progress of the large-
scale political negotiations on the future of Europe an security. This 
last point shows clearly that political will from now on will take 
precedence over former debates of a technical military nature, th us 
opening the path to a new era in the history of East-West relations. 
In spite of the technical military opposition between East 
and West, western countries are far from ruined by this costly enter-
prise. Statistics indicate that western military spending has played 
a large role in the economic growth of western countries. The sta-
tistics from eastern countries are too unreliable to provide such 
clear conclusions. There are those who believe that the West has 
ruined the East in a costly arms race: this may be true but it is not 
the only valid explanation. The failure of the Soviet economy can 
also be explained by a political regime that never allowed a market 
economy to be established, and also, possibly, by an apparent 
moving together of the formerly separate civil and military sectors 
of its economy. Whatever the reason, all authors admit that the 
money spent on arms could have been putto more productive ends, 
in the East as well as in the West. 
It is too early to know if East-West relations will follow the 
model of peace through "transsystemic objectives," the return to 
cooperation between northern industrial democracies being the 
outstanding sign of the changes that have occurred in recent years 
in Europe. Undoubtedly, environmental issues, the links between 
financial, technical, and economic assistance, and the liberalization 
of governments, as well as issues regarding the rights of the indi-
vidual, will occupy a prominent place on the agenda of East-West 
relations. 
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The North-South axis appears much less promising. The 
nations of the South spend almost as much on military affairs as the 
North, in relation to their GNPs. The growth curve of their military 
spending during recent years has also been more rapid than the 
curve for economic growth. In addition, the Middle East continues 
to be one of the most prominent global hot spots, at least if one 
considers the most frequently quoted reports of military spending 
in relation to GNP. This region also receives the most significant 
arms transfers in the world. 
The application of western arms-control models to this 
region faces many difficulties: 
Most of the countries still prefer the "peace by might" 
model; 
The political situation is becoming graver in Israel and it is 
deteriorating in the occupied territories; 
The Arab states are experiencing new rivalries, parti-
cularly between Syria and Iraq; 
The ever-present dispute over leadership of the Arab world 
continues; and 
The development of Islamic fundamentalism is rapidly 
progressing, from the shores of the CIS Muslim republics 
to the furthermost borders of North African countries. 
If there is one essential lesson that the countries of the 
South must learn from East-West opposition, it is the futility of 
relying solely on military spènding to change an adversarial politi-
cal situation into a partnership or dependent cooperation. Ail indi-
cations point to the urgency of moving from the "peace by might" 
to the "peace by right" model, in which military rivalry would be 
progressively regulated through arms contrai and measures for 
strengthening the confidence between nations. In the same manner, 
the major powers must reopen the peace dialogue in the different 
regions, as was done in the case ofCambodia; they must restrict the 
sale of military equipment to these countries,1 although the West 
1 In this regard, it may be necessary to reopen and expand the CATT (Conventional 
Arms Transfer Talksl negotiations of the 197os. so that China can be included. 
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has a growing surplus, work jointly for the nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons and missile technology2 and, above all, ensure the 
economic development of poor countries on the condition that they 
accept even a rudimentary liberalization of their political customs. 
The increase in regional conflicts and continued poverty in 
the Third World constitute the worst-case scenario in the southern 
hemisphere. We are leaving aside here the question ofwhich inter-
national structure (bipolarity, multipolarity, or polycentrism) is the 
most stable, or perhaps the least unstable - all empirical works in 
this field are contradictory, including the recent works by Brecher 
et al. (1988); and see also the studies by James (1989) and by Brecher 
and Wilkenfeld (1989). One thing is certain: no currently predictable 
scenarios predict that the world will be more stable than before, or 
that it will be better tomorrow than it was yesterday. It may be that 
the entire system, at least as far as East-West relations are con-
cerned, will now be less dangerous than before, but it is practically 
impossible to draw any such conclusions about conflicts in the 
South. Certain regional problems, such as the insoluble Palestinian 
crisis, the growth of Muslim fundamentalism, and the revival 
of several socioethnic conflicts, are all likely to encourage the 
spread ofterrorism throughout the world. Most of the time, terror-
ism is the result of "desperate causes," and unless the economies 
2 According to CIA director William Webster, about 15 countries will be involved in 
producing their own ballistic missiles by the year 2000. Countries that probably 
have had nuclear capabilities since the 197os are no doubt lndia and Israel; those said 
to be on the "nuclear threshold" are doubtless Pakistan and South Africa, since the 
198os; Argentina, Brazil, and North Korea will have to be added. in the 199os. 
Furthermore, most of these countries, and several others, are engaged in producing 
or purchasing ballistic missiles with a range over 300 km and probably capable of 
delivering a 500-kg Joad. lndia has developed the SLV-3, the first stage of which was 
used to develop the AGNI medium-range missile (range: 2 500 km), the latter having 
passed its first trials in 1989. Pakistan is perfecting the Shadoz (range: 300 km); 
Argentina, the Condor li (known in Egypt as the Badr-2000, range: over 1 ooo km); 
Brazil, the ss-300 and the Sondra IV (range: 1 ooo km); the People's Republic of China, 
the css-2 (range: 2 500 km), which has been purchased by Saudi Arabia; while Syria 
has the Soviet Scud and ss-21. Libya apparently has purchased the Oteiba missile from 
Brazil (range: 370 km), and Iraq, doubtless with the help of Egyptian engineers, has 
developed an offshoot of the Scud, the Al Hussein (range: 600 km), which it used in 
the war against Iran. Israel, for its part, has developed the Jericho 1 and 2 (the latter 
having a range of 1 500 km), with the Jericho 3 apparently being under study. 
Furthermore, there are certain rumours that lndia and Israel are already involved 
in the manufacture of thermonuclear warheads, which would once again raise the 
stakes in the arms race among Third World countries. 
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of Third World countries improve enormously and those same 
countries see improved terms of exchange, such causes may 
become more common. 
With anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaij an and 
Tadzhikistan, anti-Turkish pogroms in Bulgaria, the persecution 
of Jews in the former USSR, and ail the regional conflicts brewing 
throughout the world, there is no doubt that the resurgence of 
nationalism and ethnie conflicts, coupled with economic stagna-
tion, remain the two evils on which, in the future, it will be ea~y 
to capitalize to increase frustrations and thus add fuel to the 
conflicts. 
As shown in this study, terrorism is indisputably on the 
rise, at least as regards the number of dead and injured for the 
1985-1989 period. Measures to reinforce security at airports have 
certainly been considerable, but it would be naive to contend that 
airports are the only targets. In the fight against terrorism and 
drugs,3 the western powers are, quite rightly, attempting to isolate 
themselves as muchas possible, and to contain the worst damage 
these phenomena can inflict. However, only the eradication of 
social injustice, and a corresponding improvement in the distribu-
tion of wealth throughout the world, may be capable of stamping 
out these two plagues at the source. Peasant farmers in the South 
who grow coca or opium poppies would probably be more than 
happy to grow something else, if they could make a decent living 
doing so - in several Latin American countries where the average 
salary is $1 700 per year, 0.1 ha of opium poppy can generate up to 
$5 ooo profit (Dziedzic 1989: 535). This major socioeconomic problem 
can only be solved in the context of a more general policy aimed 
at eradicating cultivation of the crops in question. 
Ail is not black, however. Our study shows that there is no 
direct relationship between the assistance given and the military 
spending of the countries. This only confirms the parallel existence 
3 We do not have any figures on the cost of the war against drugs: however, we do 
know that drug traffic generates an estimated $500 billion per year (the demand in 
the USA represents $100 billion alone) (see Dziedzic 1989). Estimates of the amount of 
money Jaundered through the banking system vary around s120 billion per year. 
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of our first two analytical models. Here, military spending is based 
on geopolitical considerations in accordance with the "peace by 
might" model, while economic assistance follows "peace by right" 
criteria or, if you will, humanitarian considerations linked to social 
justice or national economic development. Certain efforts on the 
part of industrialized countries are also worth noting. In practical 
terms, Switzerland spends almost as much on assistance to devel-
oping countries as it does on its own security, the ratio of its 
assistance to its own military spending being very high. Between 
1965 and 1988, this percentage was 82 for Switzerland, 78 for Japan, 
43 for Belgium, and 38 for Canada, while the average assistance to 
military spending ratio for all OECD donor countries was 17.8%. All 
countries may consider such a policy satisfactory but it must also 
be understood, as we have already mentioned, that this ratio 
dropped to 8.2% in 1985-1988. Japan has recently emerged as the 
second most important OECD donor country and we would wish that 
other countries be inspired by this example in the future. 
However, pressing environmental issues and the priority 
given to the fight against terrorism and drugs mark a certain change 
in the perception of threats. Terrorism and the proliferation of 
nuclear arms seem to guide countries of the northern hemisphere 
toward a new solidarity to counteract the growing threat from the 
South. This solidarity is evident at international conferences on the 
protection of the environment and, equally, in the excellent coop-
eration between the different criminal police forces and intelligence 
agencies. In the same way, the countries of the North seem to have 
rediscovered the virtues of the UN in solving regional conflicts: for 
example, its role in negotiating a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, 
in supervising free elections in Namibia, and in developing a 
national unity government in Cambodia. This may herald a greater 
role for regional organizations in solving future conflicts, provided 
the nations of the South are willing to shoulder their own responsi-
bilities. 
In the case of the Gulf War, the same can be said of 
the increased role of international organizations, whatever our 
judgment on the validity of military sanctions. The Gulf War is 
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probably a special case that will not be repeated elsewhere but it 
can also be seen to mark the beginning of a new dialogue between 
the major players in the international system. The admission of 
Japan and Germany as permanent members of the Security Council 
would be enough to add new credibility to the international orga-
nization. This would also apply to Brazil, India, and Mexico to 
strengthen representation from the South. 
Canada has no difficulty knowing where it stands. Our 
study of parliamentary and media debates indicates clearly 
Canada's position. It played a primary role in the creation of the UN 
and NATO; it faithfully, although somewhat modestly, participated 
in NATO; it always believed that, outside these alliances, it could 
not increase safety or even make its influence felt. At the same time, 
it detested "The Bomb" and nuclear arms, defended the cause of 
the UN and disarmament, insisted on assistance to Third World 
countries, and was at the forefront of environmental thinking, now 
almost unanimously accepted throughout the world. 
All this, however, is a matter of speeches and words. When 
it cornes to deeds, Canada has often been less effective than it 
appears. More often than not, it has had to side with its southern 
neighbour on issues of peace and international security and it has 
often found itselfbehind many other countries when it cornes to offi-
cial assistance to Third World countries. It has, however, shown its 
worth in peace-keeping operations, for which it received.the Nobel 
Peace Prize. These operations have not been very costly, amount-
ing to about $250 million from 1945 to 1990. When these costs are 
compared to the costs for improved airport security or expenses 
incurred by the GulfWar, one can see that the vulnerability ofnorth-
ern countries to the threats from their southern counterparts is. 
becoming increasingly real and immediate, while the East-West 
threat is becoming more hypothetical and remote. This is particu-
larly true with regard to war between nations, although it does not 
exclude ethnie and social conflicts which may, at any time, reopen 
the question of the state and its functioning. This is why we have 
used the title "The End of a Military Century?" which at least refers 
to the classic opposition in East-West international relations. 
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One of the objectives of this study was to demonstrate that 
security is based more on the needs of ajust, equitable society than 
on the opposition between reasons of state that are, too often, 
looking to the past. The nature of the East-West threat bas changed 
so much that we might well ask ifit still exists. There are, however, 
other dangers on the horizon, such as pollution and environmental 
degradation due to the excesses of industrialization, the terrorist 
threat, and the threat posed by drugs. Ail these examples show that 
the problems involved in the survival of our planet must henceforth 
be examined from a North-South perspective and that it is vital to 
implement a process from which the global dimension will never be 
omitted, and always remain a priority. 
Appendix 
Military Spending 
Appendix. Africa - military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars). 
Central 
Burkina African Côte 
Year Benin Faso Burundi Cameroon Republic Chad Congo d'ivoire 
1965 10.80 7.10 5.20 40.30 4.20 15.20 11.70 57.40 
1966 9.00 8.90 5.20 42.40 5.70 22.80 16.80 57.40 
1967 10.80 8.90 5.20 44.40 7.10 22.80 18.40 60.20 
1968 10.80 8.90 7.00 48.40 8.50 24.30 15.10 66.00 
1969 10.80 8.90 7.00 48.40 9.90 22.80 23.50 63.10 
1970 10.00 10.00 6.00 46.00 11.00 28.00 32.00 53.00 
1971 10.00 10.00 6.00 47.00 12.00 28.00 32.00 74.00 
1972 9.00 10.00 9.00 46.00 10.00 27.00 33.00 89.00 
1973 10.00 10.00 10.00 45.00 12.00 27.00 37.00 64.00 
1974 9.00 10.00 11.00 47.00 10.00 31.00 39.00 75.00 
1975 9.00 20.00 11.00 51.00 9.00 34.00 40.00 83.00 
1976 9.00 25.00 11.00 56.00 10.00 32.00 41.00 103.00 
1977 10.00 21.00 15.00 51.00 11.00 26.00 41.00 90.00 
1978 15.00 30.00 16.00 61.00 11.00 23.00 44.00 158.00 
1979 15.00 29.00 20.00 59.00 9.00 22.10 35.00 214.00 
1980 17.10 24.80 23.40 74.90 9.70 21.20 39.30 151.30 
1981 28.80 26.90 27.00 62.80 10.60 17.60 43.90 146.20 
1982 - 29.00 23.40 67.80 10.60 - 59.30 147.50 
1983 27.70 27.90 25.50 136.70 8.90 6.00 53.90 97.90 
1984 25.60 27.90 22.70 136.70 - 9.00 37.70 96.60 
1985 22.70 153.90 - 12.00 51.60 
1986 22.00 - 24.00 180.00 - 21.00 84.00 117.00 
1987 - 35.00 23.00 166.00 23.00 70.00 158.00 
1988 22.20 36.00 NA NA NA 4.20 NA 183.90 
1965-69 62.30 52.70 35.60 269.90 46.30 135.90 117.50 357.00 
1970-74 57.00 70.00 53.00 282.00 64.00 175.00 213.00 438.00 
1975-79 75.10 149.80 96.40 352.90 59.70 158.40 240.30 799.30 
1980-84 99.10 136.50 144.70 632.70 39.80 65.70 285.70 639.70 
1985-88 44.20 71.00 69.70 499.90 NA 60.20 205.60 458.90 
1965-88 337.80 480.00 399.40 2 037.40 209.90 595.20 1 062.10 2 692.90 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Africa - Military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars) (continued). 
Year Ethiopia Gabon Ghana Guinea Kenya Liberia Libya 
1965 56.60 11.70 169.10 32.60 18.30 4.90 115.00 
1966 60.90 11.70 206.20 40.80 24.90 4.90 134.60 
1967 59.50 11.70 284.50 42.80 16.60 6.50 140.20 
1968 69.60 11.70 284.50 42.80 36.50 6.50 168.30 
1969 71.10 17.60 263.90 42.80 31.50 6.50 235.60 
1970 66.00 21.00 208.00 30.00 32.00 8.00 443.00 
1971 71.00 24.00 195.00 29.00 34.00 7.00 440.00 
1972 80.00 26.00 169.00 26.00 46.00 6.00 335.00 
1973 62.00 28.00 125.00 25.00 55.00 5.00 390.00 
1974 62.00 20.00 156.00 24.00 56.00 5.00 361.00 
1975 126.00 24.00 185.00 23.00 68.00 4.00 262.00 
1976 166.00 20.00 205.00 22.00 64.00 5.00 373.00 
1977 199.00 21.00 95.00 22.00 113.00 6.00 451.00 
1978 103.00 9.00 70.00 205.00 9.00 729.00 
1979 322.00 64.00 3.00 255.00 8.00 394.00 
1980 373.30 82.70 46.50 23.60 246.60 10.80 2 065.30 
1981 354.80 65.30 74.70 70.10 182.80 24.70 
1982 356.60 67.90 69.10 233.60 32.30 2 131.30 
1983 355.70 59.20 35.20 228.20 17.70 2 665.70 
1984 368.90 58.30 63.40 47.30 209.80 14.60 3 048.40 
1985 349.60 - 102.90 233.60 17.10 
1986 337.00 124.00 106.00 160.00 22.00 
1987 366.00 111.00 171.00 24.00 1 467.00 
1988 NA 111.50 58.80 22.40 277.10 NA NA 
1965-69 383.70 85.60 1416.10 231. 90 159.80 37.30 1 236.70 
1970-74 467.00 143.00 1038.00 157.00 291.00 35.00 
2 231.00 
1975-79 1 289.30 156.70 665.50 93.60 951.60 42.80 4 274.30 
1980-84 2 158.90 333.50 391.80 141.00 1 334.60 117.10 9 910.70 
1985-88 1 052.60 235.50 378.60 22.40 841.70 63.10 1 467.00 
1965-88 5 351.40 954.20 3890.00 645.90 3 578.70 232.10 17 652.70 
---
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Africa - Military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars) (continued). 
Year Malawi Mali Morocco Mauritania Niger Nigeria Rwanda 
1965 0.50 13.90 161.20 5.10 14.70 325.60 7.40 
1966 0.90 13.90 173.80 5.10 7.40 260.40 12.30 
1967 0.90 15.60 188.10 5.10 7.40 678.20 7.40 
1968 0.90 12.20 218.60 5.10 9.20 1 039.10 9.80 
1969 0.90 13.90 224.00 5.10 9.20 1 994.00 9.80 
1970 2.00 15.00 203.00 5.00 8.00 1 880.00 12.00 
1971 3.00 13.00 219.00 5.00 7.00 1 527.00 13.00 
1972 3.00 16.00 246.00 8.00 8.00 1 905.00 11.00 
1973 5.00 18.00 275.00 9.00 6.00 1 491.00 16.00 
1974 6.00 19.00 290.00 10.00 6.00 1 244.00 12.00 
1975 6.00 23.00 467.00 10.00 9.00 1 601.00 10.00 
1976 11.00 25.00 712.00 30.00 9.00 2 033.00 10.00 
1977 18.00 30.00 838.00 30.00 9.00 2 179.00 10.00 
1978 22.00 28.00 772.00 29.00 9.00 2 054.00 13.00 
1979 18.00 30.00 762.00 - 10.00 1 531.00 14.00 
1980 49.70 23.60 906.60 52.70 9.80 1 575.70 20.70 
1981 31.20 22.60 940.20 41.10 9.80 1 472.50 20.00 
1982 23.40 24.50 985.80 38.00 9.00 1 169.50 23.70 
1983 19.50 24.50 771.20 27.90 9.00 1 045.00 27.40 
1984 18.50 21.70 755.10 8.10 737.80 
1985 - 24.50 1013.90 34.90 9.00 640.60 22.20 
1986 27.00 - 1 163.00 29.00 9.00 525.00 
1987 20.00 30.00 1 196.00 22.00 - 384.00 26.00 
1988 31.20 29.80 1 122.30 NA 11.90 462.90 17.70 
1965-69 6.20 84.40 1 168.70 30.30 55.80 6 177.30 58.60 
1970-74 25.00 104.00 1 700.00 47.00 44.00 9 648.00 74.00 
1975-79 124.70 159.60 4 457.60 151.70 55.80 10 973.70 77.70 
1980-84 142.20 141.30 5 372.80 194.40 54.50 6 641.00 113.90 
1985-88 78.20 84.30 4 495.20 85.90 29.80 2 012.50 65.90 
1965-88 376.20 573.70 17 194.40 509.30 240.00 35 452.60 390.00 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Africa - Military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars) (continued). 
Sierra South 
Year Sénégal Leone Somali a Africa Sud an Tanzania Togo 
1965 35.JO 4.80 27.90 578.00 J09.30 15.20 7.JO 
1966 31.90 4.80 35.90 659.20 J07.40 20.90 5.30 
1967 35.JO 3.20 35.90 730.50 120.40 20.90 7.10 
1968 35.JO 3.20 39.90 748.70 133.30 30.40 7.10 
1969 35.JO 4.80 43.80 856.50 151.90 26.60 7.10 
1970 35.00 5.00 30.00 762.00 128.00 40.00 7.00 
1971 36.00 7.00 30.00 867.00 147.00 54.00 8.00 
1972 35.00 5.00 30.00 848.00 140.00 76.00 JO.OO 
1973 34.00 7.00 30.00 1 061.00 142.00 76.00 11.00 
1974 33.00 6.00 35.00 1 305.00 155.00 109.00 13.00 
1975 34.00 8.00 32.00 1 671.00 130.00 141.00 JO.OO 
1976 38.00 7.00 32.00 2 043.00 125.00 131.00 14.00 
1977 41.00 7.00 34.00 2 140.00 175.00 142.00 18.00 
1978 49.00 JO.OO 67.00 1 800.00 231.00 175.00 20.00 
1979 58.00 13.00 85.00 1 602.00 218.00 251.00 19.00 
1980 85.00 8.70 49.00 544.00 178.30 113.60 13.JO 
1981 65.30 12.JO 48.70 618.90 169.70 139.70 14.00 
1982 66.30 J0.40 49.40 605.40 223.60 170.50 13.JO 
1983 65.30 8.70 45.JO 757.40 111.80 158.60 12.30 
1984 62.20 6.90 32.JO 931.60 111.20 141.30 13.JO 
1985 65.30 8.70 1 599.20 92.JO 147.60 15.60 
1986 70.00 5.00 32.00 2 007.00 82.00 - 29.00 
1987 60.00 - 2 295.00 124.00 - 31.00 
1988 58.30 5.80 NA 2 362.50 134.00 201.60 NA 
1965-69 207.30 25.60 213.40 4 334.90 750.30 154.JO 40.50 
1970-74 207.00 38.00 187.00 6 514.00 842.00 496.00 59.00 
1975-79 305.00 53.70 299.00 9 800.00 1 057.30 953.60 94.10 
1980-84 409.40 55.40 224.20 3 457.30 886.70 871.20 81.30 
1985-88 253.60 19.40 32.00 8 263.70 432.JO 349.20 75.60 
1965-88 1382.30 192.10 955.60 32 369.90 3 968.30 2 824.10 350.60 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Africa - Military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars) (continued). 
Year Tunisia Uganda Zaïre Zambia Africa 
1965 32.90 69.50 192.50 36.00 2 196.60 
1966 34.50 109.30 263.30 32.00 2 430.20 
1967 37.80 104.30 196.90 28.00 2 962.50 
1968 41.10 144.10 161.50 37.00 3 485.00 
1969 39.40 154.00 181.40 22.00 4 642.80 
1970 49.00 152.00 323.00 43.00 4 703.00 
1971 49.00 167.00 276.00 107.00 4 554.00 
1972 55.00 438.00 260.00 127.00 5 142.00 
1973 55.00 250.00 198.00 81.00 4 670.00 
1974 62.00 256.00 348.00 84.00 4 909.00 
1975 76.00 231.00 274.00 77.00 5 759.00 
1976 74.00 221.00 189.00 80.00 6 926.00 
1977 78.00 179.00 115.00 73.00 7 288.00 
1978 88.00 154.00 50.00 76.00 7 130.00 
1979 87.00 106.00 50.00 121.00 6 424.10 
1980 262.90 58.50 94.50 364.20 7 621.10 
1981 195.70 61.90 52.60 - 5 051.80 
1982 289.60 55.20 105.30 196.40 7287.10 
1983 354.80 60.20 81.00 7 325.90 
1984 259.00 88.60 71.50 164.80 7 590.40 
1985 287.60 105.30 3 410.40 
1986 286.00 196.00 5 657.00 
1987 264.00 - - - 7 066.00 
1988 236.60 134.50 57.50 NA 5 582.70 
1965-69 234.60 733.20 1 318.60 198.00 20 420.10 
1970-74 346.00 1 494.00 1 679.00 519.00 29 737.00 
1975-79 665.90 949.50 772.50 791.20 41 148.20 
1980-84 1649.70 324.30 510.20 725.30 38 286.70 
1985-88 1074.20 134.50 358.70 NA 21 716.10 
1965-88 3970.40 3 635.50 4 639.00 2233.50 151 308.10 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1900). 
Appendix. Central America - Military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars). 
Dominican El Gua te- Hon-
Year Republic Salvador mal a Haïti duras Jamaica Mexico 
1965 65.40 19.50 30.40 14.30 11.60 6.10 305.90 
1966 63.90 19.50 32.20 13.00 13.30 5.20 363.70 
1967 59.40 21.30 34.00 13.00 14.90 5.20 353.10 
1968 56.50 33.70 14.30 14.30 13.30 6.10 386.60 
1969 53.50 60.30 34.00 13.00 28.20 5.20 403.30 
1970 54.00 21.00 58.00 14.00 12.00 5.00 413.00 
1971 55.00 23.00 40.00 17.00 17.00 7.00 450.00 
1972 53.00 28.00 46.00 17.00 21.00 7.00 504.00 
1973 55.00 27.00 38.00 14.00 20.00 10.00 521.00 
1974 64.00 31.00 41.00 12.00 18.00 9.00 541.00 
1975 62.00 31.00 60.00 12.00 22.00 9.00 694.00 
1976 70.00 32.00 65.00 11.00 26.00 16.00 627.00 
1977 76.00 34.00 82.00 11.00 27.00 16.00 607.00 
1978 86.00 44.00 59.00 13.00 31.00 20.00 444.00 
1979 96.00 41.00 56.00 22.00 30.00 23.00 428.00 
1980 68.90 74.80 90.70 18.70 42.70 11.00 447.60 
1981 77.20 90.10 88.00 21.10 35.30 14.50 594.10 
1982 72.00 98.30 120.50 19.30 40.70 19.10 568.30 
1983 69.90 97.70 127.10 16.90 52.00 16.20 569.70 
1984 60.10 148.50 119.10 17.50 80.00 9.90 733.10 
1985 71.50 134.30 111.90 17.50 77.40 9.90 691.10 
1986 72.00 - - 78.00 685.00 
1987 77.00 101.00 96.00 20.00 78.00 13.00 605.00 
1988 60.60 86.70 110.30 16.30 61.80 11.90 668.00 
1965-69 298.60 154.20 145.00 67.40 81.40 27.70 1 812.60 
1970-74 281.00 130.00 223.00 74.00 88.00 38.00 2 429.00 
1975-79 390.00 182.00 322.00 69.00 136.00 84.00 2 800.00 
1980-84 348.00 509.40 545.40 93.30 250.80 70.80 2 912.70 
1985-88 281.10 322.10 318.20 53.80 295.20 34.80 2 649.10 
1965-88 1 598.70 1 297.60 1 553.60 357.50 851.40 255.30 12 603.40 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Central America - Military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars) (continued). 
Trinidad 
and Central 
Year Nicaragua Panama Tobago America 
1965 17.50 1.80 7.40 479.80 
1966 19.10 1.80 7.40 539.00 
1967 20.70 1.80 7.40 530.70 
1968 19.10 1.80 7.40 552.90 
1969 20.70 3.50 7.40 629.10 
1970 23.00 13.00 13.00 626.00 
1971 27.00 24.00 10.00 670.00 
1972 26.00 15.00 11.00 728.00 
1973 26.00 16.00 7.00 734.00 
1974 29.00 15.00 6.00 766.00 
1975 39.00 17.00 7.00 953.00 
1976 41.00 16.00 7.00 911.00 
1977 42.00 16.00 7.00 918.00 
1978 62.00 17.00 12.00 788.00 
1979 39.00 14.00 12.00 761.00 
1980 93.40 - 22.00 869.70 
1981 119.20 34.00 27.30 1 100.80 
1982 180.20 45.80 81.50 1 245.60 
1983 189.60 63.90 123.40 1 326.40 
1984 233.40 68.70 99.50 1 569.80 
1985 265.80 68.70 12.50 1 447.90 
1986 - 73.00 - 908.00 
1987 - 70.00 - 1 060.00 
1988 NA 78.20 NA 1 094.00 
1965-69 97.10 10.60 36.90 2 731.50 
1970-74 131.00 83.00 47.00 3 524.00 
1975-79 223.00 80.00 45.00 4 331.00 
1980-84 815.90 212.40 353.70 6112.40 
1985-88 265.80 289.90 12.50 4 509.90 
1965-88 1 267.00 675.90 482.50 20 943.00 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (11190}. 
Appendix. North America - military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars). 
United North 
Year Canada States America 
1965 3 353.60 103 751.40 107 105.00 
1966 3 410.20 123 725.70 127 135.90 
1967 3 650.70 142 263.00 145 913.70 
1968 3 466.80 146 574.00 150 040.80 
1969 3 268.70 140 826.00 144 094.70 
1970 3 417.00 128 844.00 132 261.00 
1971 3 428.00 117 882.00 121 310.00 
1972 3 426.00 117 415.00 120 841.00 
1973 3 371.00 112 094.00 115 465.00 
1974 3 473.00 112 280.00 115 753.00 
1975 3 427.00 108 493.00 111 920.00 
1976 3 589.00 103 303.00 106 892.00 
1977 3 850.00 108 036.00 111 886.00 
1978 4 087.00 108 357.00 112 444.00 
1979 3 834.00 112 349.00 116 183.00 
1980 3 891.30 115 297.00 119 188.30 
1981 4 023.80 124 087.60 128 111.40 
1982 4 438.10 134 789.20 139 227.30 
1983 4 459.60 143 516.10 147 975.70 
1984 4 994.00 151 032.70 156 026.70 
1985 5 314.70 157 721.20 163 035.90 
1986 5 567.00 169 999.00 175 566.00 
1987 5 672.00 173 573.00 179 245.00 
1988 5 676.30 173 337.50 179 013.80 
1965-69 17 149.80 657 140.10 674 289.90 
1970-74 17 115.00 588 515.00 605 630.00 
1975-79 18 787.00 540 538.00 559 325.00 
1980-84 21 806.90 668 722.60 690 529.50 
1985-88 22 230.00 674 630.70 696 860.70 
1965-88 97 088.70 3 129 546.40 3 226 635.00 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. South America - military spending (millions, 1978 constant us dollars). 
Year Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Columbia Ecuador 
1965 869.10 53.40 1 292.10 217.80 182.50 57.30 
1966 980.20 50.30 1 483.00 256.10 187.70 55.30 
1967 926.60 50.30 1 628.20 236.90 173.80 49.60 
1968 942.50 47.10 1 594.40 252.60 187.70 51.50 
1969 45.60 50.30 1 773.50 249.10 172.10 68.70 
1970 984.00 49.00 1 460.00 318.00 205.00 76.00 
1971 771.00 50.00 1 556.00 327.00 376.00 79.00 
1972 729.00 60.00 1 657.00 392.00 203.00 104.00 
1973 859.00 50.00 1 843.00 439.00 205.00 99.00 
1974 1 051.00 62.00 1 820.00 811.00 184.00 115.00 
1975 1 438.00 82.00 1 765.00 574.00 228.00 141.00 
1976 1 464.00 84.00 2 110.00 254.00 187.00 144.00 
1977 1 643.00 79.00 2 023.00 335.00 153.00 191.00 
1978 1 793.00 80.00 2 042.00 417.00 167.00 163.00 
1979 1 713.00 79.00 1 580.00 413.00 199.00 142.00 
1980 2 532.30 105.00 1 465.90 625.00 270.70 177.50 
1981 2 447.30 125.30 1 449.00 684.60 261.30 183.60 
1982 3 912.70 62.90 1 951.00 634.90 314.90 164.50 
1983 2 852.90 44.20 1 755.50 629.50 347.50 134.50 
1984 2 344.00 69.30 1 749.20 655.70 382.20 131.70 
1985 978.60 86.40 2 363.20 664.70 313.40 158.80 
1986 1 310.00 97.00 3 567.00 599.00 303.00 207.00 
1987 928.00 99.00 1 969.00 699.00 330.00 212.00 
1988 1 906.50 142.50 851.60 782.10 562.20 158.80 
1965-69 4 748.10 300.30 9 231.20 1 530.50 1108.80 358.50 
1970-74 5 832.00 353.00 10 101.00 2 861.00 1 401.00 614.00 
1975-79 10 583.30 509.00 10 985.90 2 618.00 1 204.70 958.50 
1980-84 16 099.40 406.70 10 733.90 3 894.40 l 890.10 791.80 
1985-88 5 123.10 424.80 8 750.80 2 744.80 1 508.70 736.60 
1965-88 42 385.90 1 993.90 49 802.80 13 648.70 7 113.30 3 459.30 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. South America - military spending (millions, 1978 constant us dollars) (continued). 
Year Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela South America 
1965 16.40 212.50 74.10 370.00 3 345.10 
1966 18.00 205.40 61.50 376.90 3 674.30 
1967 24.60 274.20 74.10 426.60 3 864.90 
1968 24.60 313.40 61.50 407.70 3 883.10 
1969 24.60 268.30 75.60 399.10 3 126.90 
1970 25.00 263.00 83.00 462.00 3 925.00 
1971 24.00 275.00 111.00 582.00 4 151.00 
1972 25.00 283.00 95.00 538.00 4 086.00 
1973 22.00 338.00 98.00 555.00 4 508.00 
1974 22.00 346.00 110.00 606.00 5 127.00 
1975 28.00 466.00 107.00 658.00 5 487.00 
1976 29.00 545.00 117.00 635.00 5 569.00 
1977 32.00 796.00 118.00 676.00 6 046.00 
1978 33.00 591.00 109.00 643.00 6 038.00 
1979 33.00 449.00 115.00 522.00 5 245.00 
1980 45.30 619.30 160.70 498.90 6 500.60 
1981 52.90 555.60 218.70 447.20 6 425.50 
1982 60.40 610.10 204.20 660.00 8 575.70 
1983 81.80 553.70 152.50 544.00 7 096.10 
1984 54.80 842.90 124.30 555.80 6 909.90 
1985 39.70 823.90 118.00 488.60 6 035.30 
1986 882.00 121.00 597.00 7 683.00 
1987 37.00 732.00 1 375.00 6 381.00 
1988 54.60 NA 110.50 565.70 5 134.30 
1965-69 133.20 1 536.70 429.70 2 442.30 21 819.40 
1970-74 146.00 1 971.00 604.00 3 401.00 27 284.00 
1975-79 200.30 3 466.30 726.70 3 632.90 34 885.60 
1980-84 334.80 4 005.50 978.40 3 194.50 42 329.50 
1985-88 131.20 2 437.90 349.50 3 026.20 25 233.60 
1965-88 945.60 10 979.50 3 088.20 15 697.00 138 134.80 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Asia - Military spending (millions, 19]8 constant us dollars). 
Year Afghanistan China In dia Indonesia Japan North Korea South Korea 
1965 38.70 12 048.70 2 592.60 474.60 3 486.00 574.50 477.20 
1966 40.90 13 579.80 2 352.30 259.90 3 745.00 559.10 565.40 
1967 43.00 13 100.50 2 301.70 562.70 3 984.00 727.80 606.00 
1968 47.30 13 446.70 2 478.80 739.00 4 342.60 907.10 708.60 
1969 49.50 16 775.00 2516.70 829.40 4 780.80 872.90 816.00 
1970 47.00 32 933.00 2 606.00 915.00 5 153.00 954.00 814.00 
1971 43.00 34 012.00 3 149.00 1 034.00 5 747.00 1 193.00 1 031.00 
1972 51.00 34 027.00 3 064.00 1 105.00 6 427.00 1 550.00 1132.00 
1973 56.00 35 048.00 2 626.00 1 026.00 6 841.00 1 550.00 995.00 
1974 51.00 35 027.00 2 808.00 1 087.00 7 321.00 1 789.00 1 283.00 
1975 64.00 33 998.00 3 396.00 1 511.00 7 628.00 1 482.00 1 587.00 
1976 89.00 35 980.00 3 296.00 1 479.00 7 913.00 1 481.00 2 233.00 
1977 71.00 35 004.00 3 251.00 1 533.00 8 385.00 1 341.00 2 512.00 
1978 75.00 35 000.00 3 495.00 1 510.00 8 851.00 1 310.00 2 971.00 
1979 227.40 38 497.00 3 420.00 1 937.00 9 748.00 1 208.00 2 838.00 
1980 222.20 48 430.50 4 123.30 1 761.80 9 884.30 3 011.70 2 949.30 
1981 191.60 47 204.40 4 521.10 1 982.10 10 344.30 3297.10 3 211.50 
1982 160.10 47 613.10 5 032.30 2 000.80 10 971.50 3 393.00 3 365.70 
1983 196.80 47 531.30 5 370.90 1 792.40 11 618.70 3 479.90 3 486.50 
1984 251.00 48 737.00 5 773.60 1 802.60 12 305.60 3 560.00 3 523.00 
1985 - 49 247.90 5 967.60 1 798.40 13 022.40 3 582.60 3 767.00 
1986 - 38 965.00 5 893.00 1 856.00 13 340.00 3 447.00 4 050.00 
1987 38 965.00 6 511.00 1 588.00 14 057.00 3 457.00 4 146.00 
1988 NA 39 382.80 6 598.40 1 449.00 14 930.30 2 328.60 4 148.80 
1965--69 219.40 68 950.70 12 242.00 2 865.50 20 338.30 3 641.30 3 173.10 
1970-74 248.00 171 047.00 14 253.00 5 167.00 31 489.00 7 036.00 5 255.00 
1975-79 526.40 178 479.00 16 858.00 7 970.00 42 525.00 6 822.00 12 141.00 
1980-84 1 021.70 239 516.30 24 821.30 9 339.80 55 124.40 16 741.80 16 536.00 
1985-88 NA 166 560.70 24 970.00 6 691.40 55 349.80 12 815.20 16111.80 
1965-88 2 015.50 824 553.70 93 144.30 32 033.70 204 826.50 47 056.30 53 216.90 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (11)90). 
Appendix. Asia - military spending (millions, 1978 constant us dollars) (continued). 
Year Malaysia Nepal Pakistan Philippine Sri Lanka Thailand Asia 
1965 216.90 7.80 548.40 153.10 11.60 193.40 20 823.40 
1966 273.90 5.20 403.80 144.60 12.40 200.30 22 142.60 
1967 264.40 7.80 377.30 170.10 12.40 240.10 22 397.80 
1968 242.20 7.80 420.40 193.90 13.30 297.00 23 844.50 
1969 239.10 7.80 425.90 210.90 13.30 354.00 27 891.10 
1970 268.00 7.00 762.00 161.00 13.00 407.00 45 040.00 
1971 287.00 8.00 844.00 169.00 25.00 502.00 48 044.00 
1972 496.00 8.00 899.00 240.00 22.00 503.00 49 524.00 
1973 430.00 9.00 950.00 302.00 17.00 443.00 50 293.00 
1974 505.00 9.00 857.00 369.00 16.00 445.00 51 567.00 
1975 576.00 8.00 955.00 623.00 16.00 476.00 52 320.00 
1976 541.00 11.00 997.00 662.00 14.00 570.00 55 266.00 
1977 599.00 14.00 909.00 636.00 15.00 668.00 54 938.00 
1978 677.00 13.00 976.00 474.00 19.00 717.00 56 088.00 
1979 620.00 15.00 980.00 447.00 21.00 843.00 60 801.40 
1980 780.70 15.50 1 072.90 521.80 8.20 1 022.50 73 804.60 
1981 1 146.90 17.10 1 165.60 507.40 15.70 1 017.20 74 621.90 
1982 1 190.20 17.10 1 301.90 470.00 13.80 1134.10 76 663.50 
1983 1 063.00 20.90 1 606.60 463.20 10.70 1142.50 77 783.40 
1984 849.80 23.30 1 596.90 322.90 10.00 1 224.30 79 980.30 
1985 831. 70 24.00 1 858.10 329.70 10.00 1 401.60 81 841.10 
1986 950.00 2 101.00 320.00 93.00 1 348.00 72 363.00 
1987 752.00 27.00 2 237.00 364.00 120.00 1 314.00 73 538.00 
1988 710.40 26.90 2 462.90 503.60 194.60 1 274.80 74 011.10 
1965--69 1 236.50 36.40 2 175.80 872.50 63.00 1 284.90 117 099.40 
1970-74 1 986.00 41.00 4 312.00 1 241.00 93.00 2 300.00 244 468.00 
1975-79 3 013.00 61.00 4 817.00 2 842.00 85.00 3 274.00 279 413.40 
1980-84 5 030.60 93.80 6 743.90 2 285.30 58.30 5 540.50 382 853.60 
1985-88 3 244.10 77.90 8 659.00 1 517.30 417.60 5 338.40 301 753.20 
1965-88 14 510.10 310.20 26 707.60 8 758.10 716.90 17 737.80 1 323 572.20 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Eastern Europe - military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars. 
Czecho- East Yugo- Eastern 
Year Bulgaria slovakia German y Hungary Romania USSR slavia Europe 
1965 1 823.10 4 772.40 3 447.60 1 881.50 3 119.80 103 822.80 1 199.40 120 066.60 
1966 1 832.50 4751.90 3 523.80 1 768.90 3 039.30 106 667.30 1 212.70 122 796.40 
1967 1 838.20 4 977.30 3 752.40 1 714.50 2 817.90 110 933.90 1 256.30 127 290.50 
1968 1 826.90 5 018.20 4 647.60 1 823.30 2 898.40 116 622.90 1 440.40 134 277.60 
1969 1 879.60 4 977.30 4 876.20 1 926.20 3 200.30 119 467.30 1 465.10 137 791.90 
1970 1 936.00 4 031.00 5 007.00 2 052.00 3 156.00 127 762.00 1 031.00 144 975.00 
1971 2 059.00 4 366.00 5 127.00 2 037.00 3 121.00 130 224.00 931.00 147 865.00 
1972 2 209.00 4 479.00 5 293.00 2 035.00 3 472.00 134 445.00 1 032.00 152 965.00 
1973 2 380.00 4 676.00 5 622.00 2 062.00 3 451.00 140 478.00 1 228.00 159 897.00 
1974 2 597.00 4 700.00 5 698.00 2 156.00 3 600.00 147 169.00 1 713.00 167 633.00 
1975 2 558.00 4 871.00 5 940.00 2 119.00 3 693.00 151 381.00 1 952.00 172 514.00 
1976 2 649.00 4 767.00 6 088.00 1 951.00 3 868.00 158 225.00 2 033.00 179 581.00 
1977 2 674.00 4 795.00 6 125.00 1 895.00 3 806.00 159 927.00 2 230.00 181 452.00 
1978 2 559.00 4 897.00 6 276.00 1 990.00 3 816.00 161 600.00 2 284.00 183 422.00 
1979 2 529.00 4 763.00 6 292.00 1 892.00 3 672.00 166 669.00 2 664.00 188 481.00 
1980 2 434.10 5 440.70 6 692.10 2 004.40 4 075.40 156 788.60 2 587.30 180 022.40 
1981 2 477.50 5 534.80 6 893.10 2 019.50 3 990.70 157 285.10 2 496.30 180 697.10 
1982 2 765.70 5 958.70 7 333.20 2 025.00 4 517.30 158 464.50 2 264.90 183 329.20 
1983 2 775.00 6 059.20 7 584.80 1 986.30 4 594.30 160 947.30 2 136.80 186 083.60 
1984 2 784.90 6 084.90 7 768.20 1 954.80 4 526.80 163 864.50 2 223.60 189 207.70 
1985 2 791.10 6 175.80 8 024.90 2 072.10 4 534.40 165 416.30 2 256.60 191 271.40 
1986 3 679.00 7 276.00 8 666.00 2 511.00 5 864.00 169 587.00 2 497.00 200 080.00 
1987 3 721.00 7 523.00 8 996.00 2 511.00 5 981.00 173 013.00 1 357.00 203 102.00 
1988 4 532.30 7 857.70 10 005.30 3 046.90 6 885.90 161 743.40 2 095.60 196167.20 
1965-69 9 200.30 24 497.10 20 247.60 9 114.40 15 075.50 557 514.20 6 573.90 642 222.90 
1970-74 11 181.00 22 252.00 26 747.00 10 342.00 16 800.00 680 078.00 5 935.00 773 335.00 
1975-79 12 969.00 24 093.00 30 721.00 9 847.00 18 855.00 797 802.00 11 163.00 905 450.00 
1980-84 13 237.20 29 078.20 36 271.40 9 990.00 21 704.50 797 349.90 11 708.90 919 340.00 
1985-88 14 723.50 28 832.60 35 692.20 10 141.10 23 265.40 669 759.60 8 206.20 790 620.60 
1965-88 61 311.00 128 752.90 149 679.10 49 434.40 95 700.40 3 502 503.70 43 587.00 4030 968.50 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Western Europe - military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars). 
West 
Year Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France German y 
1965 399.40 1 858.80 1 024.90 359.20 13 677.40 17 804.80 
1966 454.30 1 883.30 1 008.30 350.10 14 031.80 17 472.00 
1967 465.30 1 964.60 1 034.20 342.80 14 756.80 18 304.00 
1968 467.20 2 059.00 1 139.60 386.40 14 740.70 16 224.00 
1969 480.00 2 059.00 1 102.60 350.10 13 886.80 17 472.00 
1970 472.00 2 170.00 1 047.00 395.00 14 450.00 17 204.0 
1971 450.00 2 239.00 1124.00 418.00 14 597.00 18 004.00 
1972 475.00 2 344.00 1 092.00 441.00 14 960.00 19 246.00 
1973 484.00 2 451.00 1 036.00 475.00 15 448.00 20 169.00 
1974 540.00 2 493.00 1 161.00 455.00 15 739.00 21 080.00 
1975 599.00 2 720.00 1 237.00 523.00 16198.00 20 829.00 
1976 627.00 2 894.00 1 232.00 503.00 16 882.00 20 887.00 
1977 649.00 2 980.00 1 260.00 426.00 17 710.00 20 783.00 
1978 721.00 3 175.00 1 314.00 463.00 18 623.00 21 417.00 
1979 737.00 3 258.00 1 352.00 526.00 19 270.00 21 773.00 
1980 717.60 3 382.60 1 403.20 608.30 19 882.80 22 345.70 
1981 713.50 3 494.90 1 439.60 572.20 20 661.30 23 065.70 
1982 796.20 3 429.40 1 465.70 626.70 21 313.50 22 917.20 
1983 877.90 3 333.10 1 461.20 714.00 21 260.90 23 122.90 
1984 877.90 3 218.20 1 433.90 647.70 21 260.90 23 008.60 
1985 834.20 3 127.20 1 399.70 674.50 21 208.30 23 042.90 
1986 916.00 3 317.00 1 346.00 731.00 20 915.00 22 749.00 
1987 846.00 3 297.00 1 404.00 - 21 629.00 22 662.00 
1988 804.60 3138.10 1 437.90 812.70 22 006.90 22 507.50 
1965-69 2 266.20 9 824.70 5 309.50 1 788.60 71 093.40 87 276.80 
1970-74 2 421.00 11 697.00 5 460.00 2 184.00 75194.00 95 703.00 
1975-79 3 333.00 15 027.00 6 395.00 2 441.00 88 683.00 105 689.00 
1980-84 3 983.00 16 858.20 7 203.50 3 168.90 104 379.40 114 460.00 
1985-88 3 400.80 12 879.30 5 587.70 2 218.20 85 759.20 90 961.40 
1965-88 15 404.00 66 286.30 29 955.70 11 800.70 425 109.10 494 090.20 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA {1990). 
Appendix. Western Europe - military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars) (continued). 
Nether-
Year Greece Ire land Italy Norway lands Portugal 
1965 523.30 98.00 5 139.20 842.70 3 068.70 610.70 
1966 576.80 96.40 5 574.40 831.00 2 972.20 642.00 
1967 735.70 91.70 5 490.70 859.40 3 281.00 803.90 
1968 853.10 94.90 5 574.40 917.90 3 242.40 885.70 
1969 967.10 94.90 5 390.30 964.70 3 435.40 830.70 
1970 1 007.00 98.00 5 178.00 965.00 3 446.00 873.00 
1971 1 063.00 112.00 5 727.00 986.00 3 569.00 959.00 
1972 1 124.00 117.00 6 292.00 1 006.00 3 627.00 975.00 
1973 1 087.00 134.00 6 237.00 997.00 3 671.00 938.00 
1974 1 085.00 142.00 6 278.00 1 003.00 3 849.00 1 184.00 
1975 1 753.00 196.00 5 814.00 1 119.00 4 011.00 810.00 
1976 1 680.00 177.00 5 727.00 1 164.00 3 964.00 659.00 
1977 2 024.00 185.00 6 052.00 1 203.00 4 426.00 610.00 
1978 2 071.00 195.00 6 246.00 1 307.00 4 227.00 622.00 
1979 1 890.00 195.00 6 619.00 2 246.00 4 499.00 640.00 
1980 1 886.70 216.80 6 864.10 1 283.20 4 186.00 736.10 
1981 2 320.80 212.60 6 981.00 1 292.20 4 277.40 743.90 
1982 2 296.00 253.30 7 385.60 1 356.50 4 257.60 748.30 
1983 2 120.80 245.60 7 527.30 1 446.70 4 258.70 729.50 
1984 2 486.80 242.20 7 753.60 1 388.60 4 379.80 693.20 
1985 2 503.30 253.30 8 040.50 1 602.90 4 322.50 694.30 
1986 2 213.00 238.00 6 851.00 1 667.00 4 368.00 792.00 
1987 2 220.00 - 7 670.00 1 837.00 4 462.00 818.00 
1988 2 387.20 225.70 8 531.30 2 936.50 4 517.90 833.50 
1965-69 3 656.10 475.90 27 169.00 4 415.80 15 999.70 3 773.00 
1970-74 5 366.00 603.00 29 712.00 4 957.00 18 162.00 4 929.00 
1975-79 9 418.00 948.00 30458.00 7 039.00 21 127.00 3 341.00 
1980-84 11 111.10 1170.60 36 511.60 6 767.20 21 359.40 3 650.90 
1985-88 9 323.40 717.00 31 092.80 8 043.50 17 670.40 3 137.80 
1965-88 38 874.60 3914.40 154 943.50 31 222.40 94 318.50 18 831.70 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Western Europe - military spending (millions, 1978 constant US dollars) (continued). 
Switzer- United Western 
Year Spain Sweden land Turkey King dom Europe 
1965 2 045.10 2 529.30 1 815.70 1 146.00 1 3694.70 66 637.70 
1966 2 630.00 2 662.40 1 910.40 1 126.00 1 3461.80 67683.10 
1967 3 050.80 2 629.10 1 850.30 1 216.90 1 3761.30 70 638.50 
1968 3 492.60 2 579.20 1 741.70 1 315.10 1 3561.60 69 275.50 
1969 3 408.50 2 595.80 1 854.90 1 306.00 1 2696.30 68 895.20 
1970 3 158.00 2 817.00 1 782.00 1 343.00 1 2401.00 68 806.00 
1971 3 286.00 2 866.00 1 810.00 1 545.00 1 3064.00 71 819.00 
1972 3 457.00 2 924.00 1 791.00 1 559.00 1 4018.00 75 448.00 
1973 3 389.00 2 927.00 1 745.00 1 565.00 1 4159.00 76 912.00 
1974 3 510.00 2 973.00 1 785.00 1 580.00 1 4568.00 79 425.00 
1975 3 642.00 2 928.00 1 677.00 2 594.00 1 4230.00 80 880.00 
1976 3 400.00 2 907.00 1 764.00 3 010.00 1 4757.00 82 234.00 
1977 2 491.00 2 894.00 1 800.00 2 949.00 1 4415.00 82 857.00 
1978 2 475.00 2 950.00 1 759.00 2 727.00 1 4618.00 84 910.00 
1979 2 652.00 3 011.00 1 862.00 2 307.00 1 5139.00 87 976.00 
1980 2 810.60 2 808.80 2 030.90 2 262.10 1 5513.60 88939.10 
1981 2 980.40 2 853.00 2 027.80 2 687.60 1 4676.50 91 000.30 
1982 3 166.50 2 940.30 2 085.60 3 005.90 1 5544.30 93 588.40 
1983 3 326.20 2 960.80 2 112.50 2 897.20 1 7041.90 95 437.20 
1984 3 540.50 2 912.60 2 193.10 2 798.80 1 7372.20 96 208.50 
1985 3 107.90 2 917.70 2 246.80 2 993.10 1 8009.60 96 978.70 
1986 3 664.00 2 854.00 2 408.00 3 421.00 1 7516.00 95 966.00 
1987 4 137.00 2 895.00 2 202.00 3 312.00 1 7401.00 96 792.00 
1988 3 901. 70 2 969.20 2 192.40 3 092.60 1 6256.00 98 551.80 
1965--69 14 627.00 12 995.80 9 173.00 6 110.00 67 175.70 343 130.10 
1970-74 16 800.00 14 507.00 8 913.00 7 592.00 68 210.00 372 410.00 
1975-79 14 660.00 14 690.00 8 862.00 13 587.00 73 159.00 418 857.00 
1980-84 15 824.20 14 475.60 10 449.80 13651.60 80 148.50 465 173.50 
1985-88 14 810.60 11 635.90 9 049.10 12 818.70 69 182.60 388 288.40 
1965-88 76 721.80 68 304.30 46 447.00 53 759.30 357 875.80 1 987 859.10 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Middle East - military spending (millions, 1978 constant us dollars). 
Year Cyprus Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan 
1965 13.00 731.40 1 174.50 864.80 503.20 92.10 
1966 11.00 570.20 1 320.40 815.80 603.80 82.80 
1967 12.00 526.30 1 801.80 742.10 943.30 102.60 
1968 10.00 693.00 2 171.40 1 003.80 1 176.80 150.40 
1969 9.00 934.20 2 626.10 1 294.20 1 556.50 171.40 
1970 14.00 1 161.00 3 465.00 1 264.00 2 346.00 132.00 
1971 17.00 1 201.00 4 037.00 1 244.00 2 352.00 220.00 
1972 17.00 1 466.00 4 789.00 1 280.00 2 046.00 250.00 
1973 15.00 1 444.00 5 447.00 1 733.00 4 121.00 234.00 
1974 25.00 1 873.00 8 432.00 2 047.00 3 385.00 218.00 
1975 23.00 2 164.00 10 557.00 1 925.00 3 908.00 205.00 
1976 25.00 1 571.00 11 047.00 1 983.00 3 943.00 205.00 
1977 28.00 1 846.00 9 592.00 2 099.00 3 850.00 272.00 
1978 24.00 1 922.00 10 996.00 1 984.00 3 317.00 290.00 
1979 28.00 1 717.00 2 550.00 4 341.00 333.00 
1980 26.00 1 638.30 4 942.00 7 171.40 4 499.80 824.00 
1981 38.00 1 982.20 4 972.60 8 128.90 3 812.20 826.90 
1982 35.00 3 340.00 5 258.70 7 776.90 3 485.20 760.10 
1983 35.00 3 437.30 4 422.80 7 382.60 3 853.90 597.80 
1984 34.00 28 565.70 5 951.00 7 471.80 4 266.80 691.20 
1985 26.30 6 699.40 2 979.00 5 055.40 2 358.80 685.30 
1986 18.00 2 448.00 - 3 446.00 498.00 
1987 22.00 2 395.00 3 106.00 479.00 
1988 25.60 2 156.70 0.00 0.00 2 745.00 696.10 
1965-69 55.00 3 455.00 9 094.20 4 720.70 4 783.60 599.30 
1970-74 88.00 7 145.00 26170.00 7 568.00 14 250.00 1 054.00 
1975-79 128.00 9 220.00 42 192.00 10 541.00 19 359.00 1 305.00 
1980-84 168.00 38 963.40 25 547.00 37 931.60 19 917.90 3 700.00 
1985-88 91.90 13 699.10 2 979.00 5 055.40 11 655.80 2 358.50 
1965-88 530.90 72 482.50 105 982.20 65 816.70 69 966.20 9 016.80 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Middle East - military spending (millions, 1978 constant us dollars) (continued). 
Year Kuwait Le ban on Saudi Arabia Syria North Yemen Middle East 
1965 108.40 54.10 142.00 576.40 12.10 4 271.90 
1966 119.20 61.50 172.00 480.30 12.10 4 249.00 
1967 190.70 67.70 347.00 511.60 24.20 5 269.40 
1968 210.20 71.40 216.00 391.00 33.20 6 127.20 
1969 229.70 75.10 250.00 435.70 39.20 7 621.10 
1970 337.00 75.00 2 534.00 511.00 47.00 11 886.00 
1971 588.00 76.00 2 560.00 434.00 52.00 12 781.00 
1972 605.00 79.00 3 306.00 468.00 52.00 14 358.00 
1973 463.00 85.00 4 135.00 803.00 54.00 18 534.00 
1974 556.00 122.00 4 300.00 672.00 72.00 21 702.00 
1975 813.00 112.00 8 255.00 1150.00 96.00 29 208.00 
1976 1 045.00 115.00 10 233.00 1 138.00 110.00 31 415.00 
1977 776.00 114.00 9 361.00 1 096.00 129.00 29 163.00 
1978 1 080.00 10 096.00 1 210.00 143.00 31 062.00 
1979 906.00 13 240.00 1 975.00 318.00 25 408.00 
1980 746.30 101.60 20 220.00 1 636.40 275.30 42 081.10 
1981 655.10 84.20 22 650.00 1 510.70 355.10 45 015.80 
1982 803.40 73.40 25 480.00 1 671.40 451.00 49 135.00 
1983 966.50 117.10 27 620.00 2 357.10 449.50 51 239.50 
1984 952.40 106.60 21 890.00 2 366.40 353.60 72 542.90 
1985 984.60 92.40 18 085.80 2 388.80 300.90 39 656.70 
1986 836.00 - 11 323.00 2 191.00 138.00 20 898.00 
1987 786.00 6 651.00 1 487.00 14 926.00 
1988 759.00 0.00 9 031.40 1 139.90 490.20 17 044.00 
1965-69 858.30 329.80 1 127.00 2 395.00 120.80 27 538.70 
1970-74 2 549.00 437.00 16 835.00 2 888.00 277.00 79 261.00 
1975-79 4 620.00 341.00 51 185.00 6 569.00 796.00 146 256.00 
1980-84 4 123.70 482.80 117 860.00 9 541.90 1 884.50 260 014.20 
1985-88 3 365.60 92.40 45 091.20 7 206.70 929.10 92 524.70 
1965-88 15 516.50 1 683.00 232 098.20 28 600.60 4 007.40 604 018.10 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Oceania - military spending (millions, 1978 constant us dollars). 
Australia New Zealand Oceania 
1965 3 012.80 262.20 3 275.00 
1966 3 415.80 291.80 3 707.60 
1967 3 415.80 274.90 3 690.70 
1968 3 281.50 260.80 3 542.20 
1969 3 665.30 262.20 3 927.50 
1970 2 944.00 283.00 3 227.00 
1971 2 840.00 273.00 3 113.00 
1972 2 776.00 266.00 3 042.00 
1973 2 471.00 266.00 2 737.00 
1974 2 261.00 300.00 2 561.00 
1975 2 740.00 307.00 3 047.00 
1976 2 899.00 282.00 3 181.00 
1977 2 883.00 295.00 3 178.00 
1978 2 976.00 314.00 3 290.00 
1979 2 624.00 295.00 2 919.00 
1980 3 142.30 361.00 3 503.30 
1981 3 330.20 404.10 3 734.40 
1982 3 524.00 417.30 3 941.20 
1983 3 693.70 409.80 4103.50 
1984 3 830.30 412.60 4 242.90 
1985 4 096.90 409.80 4 506.70 
1986 3 615.00 425.00 4 040.00 
1987 3 650.00 436.00 4 086.00 
1988 3 940.60 461.30 4 401.90 
1965-69 16 791.30 1 351.70 18143.00 
1970-74 13 292.00 1 388.00 14 680.00 
1975-79 14 122.00 1 493.00 15 615.00 
1980-84 17 520.50 2 004.80 19 525.30 
1985-88 15 302.50 1 732.10 17 034.60 
1965-88 77 028.20 7 969.60 84 997.80 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. World - Military spending (millions, 1978 constant us dollars). 
Africa Central America North America South America Asia Eastern Europe 
1965 2 196.61 479.81 107 105.00 3 345.11 20 823.36 120 066.60 
1966 2 430.20 539.04 127 135.90 3 674.34 22 142.59 122 796.40 
1967 2 962.46 530.74 145 913.70 3 864.92 22 397.81 127 290.50 
1968 3 485.04 552.88 150 040.80 3 883.09 23 844.53 134 277.60 
1969 4 642.81 629.06 144 094.70 3 126.94 27 891.14 137 791.90 
1970 4 703.00 626.00 132 261.00 3 925.00 45 040.00 144 975.00 
1971 4 554.00 670.00 121 310.00 4151.00 48 044.00 147 865.00 
1972 5 142.00 728.00 120 841.00 4 086.00 49 524.00 152 965.00 
1973 4 670.00 734.00 115 465.00 4 508.00 50 293.00 159 897.00 
1974 4 909.00 766.00 115 753.00 5 127.00 51 567.00 167 633.00 
1975 5 759.00 953.00 111 920.00 5 487.00 52 320.00 172 514.00 
1976 6 926.00 911.00 106 892.00 5 569.00 55 266.00 179 581.00 
1977 7 288.00 918.00 111 886.00 6 046.00 54 938.00 181 452.00 
1978 7 130.00 788.00 112 444.00 6 038.00 56 088.00 183 422.00 
1979 6 424.12 761.00 116 183.00 5 245.00 60 801.43 188 481.00 
1980 7 621.07 869. 71 119 188.30 6 500.59 73 804.56 180 022.40 
1981 5 051.84 1 100.85 128111.40 6 425.53 74 621.89 180 697.10 
1982 7 287.12 1 245.63 139 227.30 8 575.72 76 663.48 183 329.20 
1983 7 325.90 1 326.40 147 975.70 7 096.07 77 783.41 186 083.60 
1984 7 590.36 1 569.80 156 026.70 6 909.92 79 980.26 189 207.70 
1985 3 410.43 1 447.93 163 035.90 6 035.29 81 841.08 191 271.40 
1986 5 657.00 908.00 175 566.00 7 683.00 72 363.00 200 080.00 
1987 7 066.00 1 060.00 179 245.00 6 381.00 73 538.00 203 102.00 
1988 5 582.66 1 093.98 179 013.80 5 134.35 74011.13 196 167.20 
1965-69 15 717.10 2 731.50 674 289.90 17 894.40 117 099.40 642 222.90 
1970-74 23 978.00 3 524.00 605 630.00 21 797.00 244 468.00 773 335.00 
1975-79 33 527.10 4 331.00 559 325.00 28 385.00 279 413.40 905 450.00 
1980-84 34 876.30 6 112.40 690 529.50 35 507.80 382 853.60 919 340.30 
1985-88 21 716.10 4 509.90 696 860.70 25 233.60 301 753.20 790 620.60 
1965-88 129 814.60 21 208.80 322 6635.00 128 817.90 1 325 588.00 4 030 968.00 
Source: Data adapted from ACDA (1990). 
Appendix. Military spending (millions, 1978 constant us dollars) - World (continued) 
Western Europe Middle East Oceania North South World 
1965 66 637.75 4 271.94 3 275.00 300 570.30 27 630.80 328 201.10 
1966 67 683.14 4 249.04 3 707.59 325 067.90 29 290.20 354 358.10 
1967 70 638.52 5 269.36 3 690.67 351 517.30 31 041.30 382 558.60 
1968 69 275.52 6 127.22 3 542.25 361 478.70 33 550.20 395 028.90 
1969 68 895.21 7 621.11 3 927.46 359 490.00 39 130.30 398 620.30 
1970 68 806.00 11 886.00 3 227.00 354 422.00 61 027.00 415 449.00 
1971 71 819.00 12 781.00 3 113.00 349 854.00 64 453.00 414 307.00 
1972 75 448.00 14 358.00 3 042.00 358 723.00 67411.00 426 134.00 
1973 76 912.00 18 534.00 2 737.00 361 852.00 71 898.00 433 750.00 
1974 79 425.00 21 702.00 2 561.00 372 693.00 76 750.00 449 443.00 
1975 80 880.00 29 208.00 3 047.00 375 989.00 86 099.00 462 088.00 
1976 82 234.00 31 415.00 3 181.00 379 801.00 92 174.00 471 975.00 
1977 82 857.00 29 163.00 3 178.00 387 758.00 89 968.00 477 726.00 
1978 84 910.00 31 062.00 3 290.00 392 917.00 92 255.00 485 172.00 
1979 87 976.00 25 408.00 2 919.00 405 307.00 88 891.50 494 198.50 
1980 88939.11 42 081.07 3 503.28 401 537.40 120 992.70 522 530.10 
1981 91 000.29 45 015.78 3 734.37 413 887.50 121 871.60 535 759.00 
1982 93 588.43 49 134.96 3 941.25 431 057.70 131 935.40 562 993.10 
1983 95 437.23 51 239.49 4 103.48 445 218.70 133 152.60 578 371.30 
1984 96 208.46 72 542.88 4 242.92 457 991.40 156 287.60 614 279.00 
1985 92 362.05 32 060.37 4 506.72 464 198.40 111 772.60 575 971.10 
1986 95 966.00 20 898.00 4 040.00 488 992.00 94 169.00 583 161.00 
1987 96 792.00 14 926.00 4 086.00 497 282.00 88 914.00 586 196.00 
1988 98 551.79 17 044.00 4 401.86 493 065.00 87 935.80 581 000.70 
1965-69 343 130.10 27 538.70 18 143.00 1 698 124.20 160 642.80 1 858 767.00 
1970-74 372 410.00 79 261.00 14 680.00 1 797 544.00 341 539.00 2 139 083.00 
1975-79 418 857.00 146 256.00 15 615.00 1 941 772.00 449 387.50 2 391 159.50 
1980-84 465 173.50 260 014.20 19 525.30 2 149 692.60 664 239.90 2 813 932.50 
1985-88 383 671.80 84 928.40 17 034.60 1 943 537.40 382 791.40 2 326 328.80 
1965-88 1 983 242.00 588 657.20 84 997.80 9 530 670.30 1998601.00 11 529 271.00 
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